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This thesis examines firms’ strategies in response to more intensified product market 
competition. Specifically, three studies analyse: (i) the incentive dispersion within a top 
management team (TMT); (ii) the relative compensation of the CEO to the compensation of 
other top executives; and (iii) corporate complexity. These strategies are associated with 
cooperation among the TMT, the CEO’s power, and corporate complexity.  
The results from the first study demonstrate that TMT incentive dispersion decreases 
when firms experience intense competition in the product market and this effect is more 
pronounced for innovative and diversified firms. The implication is that firms promote 
cooperation in the team by reducing TMT incentive dispersion when facing pressure from 
product market competition and that cooperation in the TMT is even more essential for firms 
operating in a dynamic environment, which requires quick responses.  
The second study reveals that the compensation disparity between the CEO and other 
management drops, implying less CEO power when product market competition becomes more 
intensified, and the impact is stronger for firms with weak corporate governance and “good 
luck.” The results suggest that when powerful CEOs are entrenched, product market competition 
can act as a substitute for corporate governance and reins in the power of CEOs.  
The third study shows that corporate complexity reduces firm performance when firms 
face increased competition in the product market. Corporate complexity can be related to the 
inefficiency of resource allocation as the impact of the interaction between corporate complexity 
and product market competition is more prominent for firms that have strong financial needs 
but cannot easily access capital.  
vii 
From a theoretical perspective, the results of this thesis show how social comparison 
theory, agency costs, and resource allocation issues can explain the strategic choices that firms 
make in response to product market competition in order to stimulate cooperation in TMT, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Product market competition is a natural challenge of firms that leads to less profitability 
due to decreasing market power (Lerner, 1934; Elzinga and Mills, 2011; Xu, 2012). The impact 
of product market competition on the decrease of firm performance pressures firms to improve 
their operational efficiency (Hart, 1983; Nickell, 1996), responsiveness (Bourgeois and 
Eisenhardt, 1988; Boyd, 1995), and monitoring of management decisions (Hou and Robinson, 
2006) to be able to continue their competitiveness. In order to gain this improvement, firms 
design strategies in response to this threat. This thesis examines the strategic reactions of firms 
to changes in product market competition by focusing on the incentive distributions in a top 
management team (TMT) and between the chief executive officer (CEO) and other top 
executives within a firm, and also focuses on the structure of business holding portfolios of firms 
because they are related to cooperation among the TMT, the power of the CEO, and corporate 
complexity, which are critical factors in response to product market competition. 
Lower TMT incentive dispersion is associated with greater cooperation within the TMT 
(Fredrickson, Davis-Blake and Sanders, 2010; Gartenberg and Wulf, 2017), which decreases 
overall heterogeneous strategic decisions in the team, leading to a firm coming up with final 
strategies quickly (Steinbach, Holcomb, Holmes, Devers and Cannella, 2017). Quick firm 
reactions are vital in a dynamic environment with intense product market competition 
(Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Boyd, 1995). Moreover, prosocial behaviors among group 
members in the psychology literature support this argument—that a member tends to be 
receptive to the suggestion of other group members when they are under stress (Driskell and 
Salas, 1991; von Dawans, Fischbacher and Kirshbaum, 2012). Therefore, in order to stimulate 
2 
cooperation among top management teams, it is expected that product market competition will 
reduce TMT incentive dispersion. 
Next, the relative compensation of a CEO to the compensation of other top executives 
within a firm was considered. It objectively captures the dominance of a CEO over the other 
executive members, which implies that the pay of a CEO higher than that of other members is 
associated with greater CEO power (Liu and Jiraporn, 2010; Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer, 
2011; Chen, Huang and Wei, 2013; Vo and Canil, 2019). The influence of CEO power on firm 
performance is ambiguous. On the one hand, firms empower CEOs to enhance operational 
efficiency by decreasing communication costs and implementation time for corporate strategic 
decisions (Cunãt and Guadalupe, 2005; Li, Lu and Phillips, 2019). Therefore, CEO power 
provides firms with an advantage in the intense competition in the product market in this view, 
and firms should grant CEOs higher compensation when they operate in intense competition in 
the product market. On the other hand, powerful CEOs are more likely to be entrenched and 
firm value is then reduced (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009; Liu and Jiraporn, 2010; Bebchuk 
et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2013; Khanna, Kim and Lu, 2015; Vo and Canil, 2019). Hence, CEO 
power is undesirable, especially when firms face rising competition in the product market, and 
therefore, it is conjectured here that product market competition will reduce the relative pay of 
a CEO to the pay of other top executives.  
Finally, the structure of the business holding portfolios of firms can be related to 
corporate complexity. The more affiliates, and the greater the span and depth that a firm’s 
business holding portfolio has, the greater corporate complexity a firm experiences (Altomonte 
and Rungi, 2013). Prior studies suggest that corporate complexity adversely affects the 
efficiency in resource allocation because firms cannot concentrate on resource utilization in the 
core businesses (Hitt, Hoskisson and Ireland, 1990; Seru, 2014). Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) 
report that firms are flattened after experiencing rising competition in the product market in 
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order to gain operational efficiency and to decrease communication costs. Furthermore, firms 
with a high degree of corporate complexity are difficult to monitor; for instance, controlling 
shareholders exploit the benefit of minority shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer, 1999) and CEOs tend to be entrenched (Berry, Bizjak, Lemmon and Naveen, 2006). 
Under the threat of product market competition leading to a decline in firm performance, it is 
difficult for firms to allocate their resources efficiently, and hence firms require monitoring of 
management decisions more carefully (Hou and Robinson, 2006). Thus, firms should consider 
strategies to reduce corporate complexity in order to enhance their performance when they face 
intensified product market competition. 
In order to examine the effect of product market competition on the firm’s strategic 
decisions, as mentioned previously, this research is separated into three studies. The main 
common independent variable of interest is product market competition. The Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI), which captures industry concentration (Gaspar and Massa, 2006), is 
used, and the Lerner index, which represents the market power of a firm and implies a lower 
price-elasticity of demand (Lerner, 1934), are also employed. Greater concentration in the 
product market and higher market power indicate less competition in the product market. Large 
U.S import tariff reductions were also employed as exogenous shocks, which firms encounter 
in the product market. The method of Huang, Jennings, and Yu (2017) was applied to calculate 
large import tariff reductions. Firms experiencing large import tariff reductions confront new 
foreign rivals, leading to more intensified competition in the product market.  
The first study, Chapter 2 of this thesis, investigates the impact of product market 
competition on TMT incentive dispersion. In order to measure this dispersion, the methods of 
Siegel and Hambrick (2005) and Steinbach et al. (2017) were followed by applying the gini 
coefficients and coefficients of variation to TMT total- and equity-only incentives, pay-
performance sensitivity, and compensation complexity among the top-five executives within a 
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firm. A quasi-natural experiment with large tariff reductions as exogenous shocks was 
conducted in order to mitigate the endogeneity problems that cause spurious relationships 
between TMT incentive dispersion and product market competition. A propensity score 
matched (PSM) on firm characteristics was also applied, including firm size, profitability, 
leverage, stock volatility, and TMT incentive dispersion.  
The results of the first study report that the dispersions in total- and equity-incentives 
and pay-performance sensitivity decline, approximately by 8% - 17% from the means, after 
firms experience large import tariff reductions—meaning that the more intense competition in 
product market raises cooperation among the TMT. Moreover, the moderating effects of 
innovation and diversification on this relationship were analyzed and it was found that this 
negative impact of product market competition on TMT incentive dispersion is more prominent 
in innovative and diversified firms, which implies that cooperation between top management 
teams becomes more essential when firms operate in high-dynamic market sectors (Bourgeois 
and Eisenhardt, 1988). 
The second study, presented in Chapter 3, examines the effect of product market 
competition on CEO power. CEO power was proxied with the relative compensation of the CEO 
to compensation of the other top executives, which can be measured according to the CEO pay 
slide (CPS) and CEO pay gap (Liu and Jiraporn, 2010; Bebchuk et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2013; 
Vo and Canil, 2019). Regressions of the CPS and CEO pay gap on the HHI and Lerner index 
were applied. Furthermore, a propensity score matching difference-in-differences (PSM-DiD) 
approach was employed that matches treated and control firms based on firm size, leverage, 
profitability, stock volatility and the relative competition as a robustness check.   
In this chapter, it was found that CPS and CEO pay gap are positively correlated with 
both the HHI and Lerner index, and both of them are reduced after firms experience large import 
tariff reductions of approximately 7% from the means. These results suggest that intense 
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competition in the product market reduces CEO power. The moderate effects of corporate 
governance and luck on the relationship were further analyzed and it was found that the negative 
effect of product market competition on CEO power is more pronounced in weak corporate 
governance firms, which are identified as firms with a higher chance that the CEO is entrenched, 
that have lower CEO ownership, less analyst following, and “good luck.” It can be interpreted 
then that product market competition works as a substitute for corporate governance (Giroud 
and Mueller, 2010; Chhaochharia, Grinstein, Grullon and Michaely, 2017) and that CEO power 
is associated with entrenchment (Bebchuk et al., 2011; Vo and Canil, 2019). 
In the final study, in Chapter 4, the effect of corporate complexity on firm performance 
when firms operate in a competitive product market was examined. The definition of complexity 
of Altomonte and Rungi (2013) was applied, as a group contains one headquarter and affiliates. 
Then, corporate complexity can be captured by the number of subsidiaries, the number of 
subsidiaries weighted by the percentage of ownership, and the number of chains and hierarchies 
of business holding portfolios of firms. These measures consider both the span and depth of 
corporate complexity. In addition, they capture corporate complexity from a cross-holding view, 
which differs from the work of Damanpour (1996) and Guadalupe and Wulf (2010), who 
consider complexity within a firm. Here a PSM-DiD approach was used. The treated and control 
firms are matched with firm characteristics, including capital expenditure (CAPEX), cash 
holding, firm size, leverage, and stock volatility. 
The results show that corporate complexity amplifies the adverse effect of product 
market competition on firm performance. Firm performance declines by approximately 1% - 
9% from its mean. The analysis of the moderating effects reports that the augmented effect of 
corporate complexity is more pronounced in firms that have a high demand for capital but have 
difficulty in accessing it, which is determined by high levels of financial constraint, opacity, and 
CAPEX spending. Notably, corporate complexity provides an opposite effect on firm 
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performance to diversification, which is considered as a proxy of complexity in various studies 
(for example, Hovakimian, 2011; Seru, 2014; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2015). 
This thesis makes several contributions. First, it contributes to the literature on the social 
comparison theory of TMT incentives. Firms want to decrease their dispersion of incentives 
among top management teams in order to assure cooperation within the team when firms face 
tension of product market competition in order to continue their competitive capability. This 
result complements the social comparison theory, which indicates that the disparity feeling of 
individuals distorts their capacity (Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson et al., 2010; 
Gartenberg and Wulf, 2017). In addition, the findings suggest that cooperation is more necessary 
when firms operate in a highly-dynamic environment, which requires fast responses, as with 
innovation and diversification (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988).  
Secondly, the findings contribute to the literature on the agency costs of CEO power. 
Powerful CEOs tend to be entrenched. For example, they are involved in incentive setting 
processes, leading to inefficient incentive plans (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Morse, Nanda and 
Seru, 2011; Vo and Canil, 2019) or they are more likely to be involved in fraud (Khanna et al., 
2015). Therefore, CEO power is associated with a decrease in firm profitability and value 
(Bebchuk et al., 2011). In addition, the results support the idea that product market competition 
is a substitution effect of corporate governance (Giroud and Mueller, 2010; Chhaochharia et al., 
2017), as market power reduces CEO power more in firms with weak corporate governance.  
Thirdly, this thesis adds to the literature that examines the relation between corporate 
complexity and firm performance. The results report that under the threat of product market 
competition, corporate complexity reduces firm performance, which can be explained by the 
inefficiency of capital allocation. These results are different from the findings of Slovin and 
Sushka (1997), Hovakimian (2011), and Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2015). The reason is that 
the present author considers various dimensions of complexity, including ownership, and the 
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span and hierarchy of firms’ business holding portfolios, which is different from prior literature. 
Moreover, not only the organizational structure within a firm but also the cross-holding structure 
between firms and their affiliates can influence firm performance. 
In sum, under the pressure of product market competition, firms aim to encourage TMT 
cooperation, control CEO power, and diminish corporate complexity. The findings suggest that 
incentives of CEOs and top executives are tools of firms to promote cooperation between the 
TMT and to restrict CEO power by, for instance, balancing the incentives of CEOs and those of 
top executives. Moreover, firms can consider adjusting the structure of their business holding 
portfolios when they need greater flexibility, especially in terms of financial assets, by reducing 
both the span and depth of their business holding portfolios. Thus, incentive policies and the 
structure of business holding portfolios can be strategically used by firms in response to more 




Chapter 2: The effect of product market competition on top 
management team incentive dispersion 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This article examines how firms compensate their executives when faced with increased 
product market competition. The literature on executive compensation, and in particular on the 
dispersion of compensation across the top management team (TMT), is characterized by the 
competing needs for firms to encourage cooperation versus competition among TMT members 
(Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001; Main, O'Reilly, and Wade, 1993; Ridge, Hill, and Aime, 
2017). According to social comparison theory, firms which look to promote greater cooperation 
among TMT members generally emphasize having a balanced distribution of incentives among 
peers who are at the same organizational level (Fredrickson, Davis-Blake, and Sanders, 2010; 
Gartenberg and Wulf, 2017). Conversely, firms seeking greater internal competition can use 
tournament style incentives where inequality of compensation across organizational levels 
encourages managerial effort (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Ridge et al., 2017; Siegel and Hambrick, 
2005). It is noteworthy, however, that both approaches treat TMT pay structures as endogenous 
to the firm (e.g. see Gartenberg and Wulf, 2017). I take product market competition (PMC) as 
an example to argue and show that firms can use TMT incentive dispersion as a strategic lever, 
not only in thinking about TMT interpersonal dynamics, but also when responding to exogenous 
changes in their market environment.1 
                                                 
1 I focus on incentive dispersion among TMT, not salary dispersion among TMT, due to its influence on members’ 
behavior. Incentive pay can be considered as a tool to motivate members of the team to achieve its goals and to 
encourage the cooperation of the team when the interests of the members become more aligned (Cadsby, Song, and 
Tapon, 2007) while salary can be considered as fixed pay and is less risky than incentive pay in the view of 
employees, so firms may have difficulty using salary to change members’ behavior. 
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More competitive product markets can have dramatic and far-reaching consequences for 
firms. They not only encourage firms to be more efficient (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), but also 
cause firms to adopt flatter organizational structures (Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010), and influence 
key strategic policies (e.g. Flammer, 2015). A further strategic response available to firms is to 
consider how to best motivate their TMTs when facing increased competitive pressure. 
However, relatively little is known about the impact of increased product market competition 
on TMT compensation structures, and in particular if TMT compensation is used as a strategic 
lever by firms faced with greater competition. In principle, how individual firms respond to 
competition shocks will be idiosyncratic, and some might in fact choose to promote greater 
competition among executives using tournament style incentive structures to increase 
managerial productivity. However, because PMC intensifies external hazards and places stress 
on organizational response mechanisms, I see two reasons to expect that, on aggregate, firms 
are considerably more motivated to promote cooperation rather than competition among TMT 
members during PMC shocks. 
First, while firms generally need to be adaptable and responsive, during PMC shocks 
they especially need the ability to make strategic decisions with speed as their control over the 
operating environment diminishes (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Gladstein and Reilly, 
1985). Second, research shows that the efficacy of group decision making under duress is 
associated with pro-social behaviors among group members, at least in part because individuals 
become more receptive to information provided by others when faced with stressful situations 
(Driskell and Salas, 1991; von Dawans, Fischbacher, Kirschbaum, Fehr, and Heinrichs, 2012). 
Therefore, firms that are under duress will have an incentive to seek quick strategic decisions 
and to further encourage pro-social TMTs. Because lower TMT incentive dispersion results in 
generally lower overall decision heterogeneity, enabling TMTs to reach decisions more quickly 
(Steinbach, Holcomb, Holmes, Devers, and Cannella, 2017), and given that social comparison 
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theory posits and finds that firms with lower TMT pay dispersion promote greater cooperation 
(Fredrickson et al., 2010; Gartenberg and Wulf, 2017), I expect that PMC shocks will likely 
increase the firm-level value of cooperative TMTs relative to competitive TMTs.  
To test this proposition this study examines the relationship between PMC and TMT 
incentive dispersion for a sample of manufacturing firms from the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
1500 between 1992 and 2014. I capture changes in PMC which are exogenous to firm pay 
structure using large reductions in U.S. import tariffs between 1995 and 2011 (Huang, Jennings, 
and Yu, 2017), and measure changes in TMT incentive dispersion (along total, equity-only and 
pay-performance sensitivity dimensions) by looking at both the gini coefficient and the 
coefficient of variation in pay among the top five executives for my sampled firms (Fredrickson 
et al., 2010; Gartenberg and Wulf, 2017; Steinbach et al., 2017). While there is some evidence 
to suggest that individual firms seek to influence their product market environment through 
lobbying during trade negotiations (Flammer, 2015; Huang et al., 2017), I do not expect that 
such efforts are based on the TMT pay policies of individual firms, and also argue that any effect 
of such efforts is likely minimized for the large-scale tariff reductions I examine. Furthermore, 
my econometric analysis applies a propensity score matched (PSM), difference-in-differences 
(DiD) methodology (e.g. as in Flammer, 2015) where treatment and control firms are matched 
on several characteristics, including proxies for size, profitability, leverage, stock volatility and 
TMT incentive dispersion. Treatment firms are in sectors which are subject to large-scale tariff 
reductions whereas control firms are not. Supplementary to this, prior research on the effects of 
PMC shocks shows that tariff cuts do not necessarily have uniform consequences across firms, 
and particularly so in the case of manufacturing firms (e.g. Dasgupta, Li, and Wang, 2018). 
Since firms differ, to some extent idiosyncratically, in response to PMC shocks, I expect that 
TMT incentive dispersion will also reflect variation in the demands placed on TMTs to process 
information and to perform their respective roles under divergent firm-level conditions. My 
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analysis therefore raises two further, but equally important, questions about how the relationship 
between PMC and TMT incentive dispersion varies across firms. 
First, I draw on the literature which examines the role of innovation in predicting firm 
outcomes. Innovative firms not only face additional risks relative to firms which pursue 
efficiency- or stability-based strategies (Hou and Robinson, 2006; Siegel and Hambrick, 2005), 
but as a result, are also especially susceptible when industry conditions deteriorate (Han, Nanda, 
and Silveri, 2016). How firms respond to adverse changes in their operating environment is 
therefore particularly consequential for innovation-oriented firms (Han et al., 2016). In addition 
to this, Siegel and Hambrick (2005) show that innovativeness also imposes a significant need 
for collaboration among senior executives since it necessitates greater coordination across 
business units and multiway information processing within organizations. Taken together, these 
findings suggest (i) that external threats pose unique challenges to innovation intensive firms, 
and (ii) that effective innovation requires collaborative TMTs. I therefore conjecture that, if 
PMC does in fact induce lower TMT incentive dispersion, this effect will be stronger for more 
innovative firms. I test this hypothesis by examining whether R&D expenditure moderates the 
relationship between PMC and TMT incentive dispersion such that more innovative firms 
experience greater declines in TMT incentive dispersion when faced with increased PMC. 
Second, I examine the role of business diversification in moderating the relationship 
between PMC and TMT incentive dispersion. Stern and Henderson (2004) show that when 
competitor firms are relatively more active in introducing new products, the probability of firm 
failure is disproportionately higher for more diversified firms. Greater competition in a firm’s 
product market appears to pose additional risks for more diversified firms, with this further 
exacerbated for firms which respond by also increasing the number of new products they bring 
to market (Stern and Henderson, 2004). At the same time, diversified firms inherently present 
greater challenges to managers because they generate more onerous information processing 
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requirements than undiversified firms (Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996, 2001). As a result, 
centralized decision making models, where CEOs take greater responsibility, are less effective, 
implying that collaboration and coordination among TMTs are crucial to effective functioning 
in highly diversified firms. These findings place an emphasis on how diversified firms respond 
when confronted with greater PMC, suggesting that such firms might have a greater need for 
cooperative, as opposed to competitive, TMTs. I therefore hypothesize that, if PMC does in fact 
reduce TMT incentive dispersion, this effect will also be stronger for more diversified firms, 
and test for the moderating effect of business diversification using the two-digit SIC business 
segments of the firms in my sample.  
My empirical results support my theoretical predictions. More specifically, I find that 
increased product market competition is associated with significantly lower TMT incentive 
dispersion for the firms in my sample. This relationship is more strongly negative for more 
innovative firms, and also stronger for increasingly diversified firms. In addition, supplementary 
tests reveal that this relationship holds when I consider the level of parity in TMT compensation 
complexity instead of incentive dispersion, along with evidence to suggest my results are linked 
with increases in firm value. My main results hold in the presence of a number of controls for 
firm characteristics and corporate governance differences across firms, and importantly, are not 
subject to some of the more common endogeneity related concerns because product market 
shocks (i.e. tariff cuts) are exogenous at the level of individual firms. 
This study makes several contributions to the literature on TMT incentives. Foremost, it 
demonstrates that firms can use the distribution of incentives among TMT members as a 
strategic lever in response to external product market threats. In fact, control over the spread of 
compensation across senior executives likely offers a key mechanism for influencing multiple 
aspects of how firms respond to exogenous changes in their operating environment, including 
potentially the speed with which they respond and the degree to which executives collaborate 
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with one another when faced with external pressures. This complements existing research and 
suggests that TMT incentive dispersion need not necessarily only relate to endogenous socio-
behavioral or economic comparisons within organizations, but can also be the product of firm-
exogenous effects such as product market instability. 
My results therefore also shed light on the ongoing debate centred on tournament versus 
social comparison theory (Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001). Firms facing new entrants in their 
product market can choose, to some degree, between either using tournament incentives to 
promote more robust decision making at the TMT level, or emphasizing reduced differences 
between executives, promoting social cohesion, and thereby improving the speed with which 
decisions are made. My results suggest that generally firms prefer to seek cooperative TMTs 
during adverse product market events, as evidenced through a reduction in TMT incentive 
dispersion. In alignment with social comparison theory, reduced TMT pay dispersion facilitates 
cooperative behavior (Fredrickson et al., 2010; Gartenberg and Wulf, 2017). Conversely, I find 
no evidence to suggest that firms promote greater competitiveness among TMT members in 
response to more competitive product markets through increased tournament incentives (i.e. 
increased TMT incentive dispersion).  
Finally, for practitioners, the findings highlight that more innovative and more 
diversified firms are particularly likely to benefit from reducing the dispersion of TMT 
incentives when confronted with a more competitive product environment. These firms 
generally find themselves in more diverse, more dynamic or more high-velocity market 
segments, and as a result appear to be at greater risk to adverse effects stemming from PMC 
shocks. Quick strategic responses to outside threats seem especially important for this group, 




2.2 Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 Product Market Competition and TMT Incentive Dispersion 
Changes in product market conditions can have profound consequences for firms, 
particularly when firms are faced with more competitive markets where barriers to entry for new 
participants are lower. Increased PMC is not only positively correlated with volatility in firm 
profits, but also creates informational uncertainty in product markets and, through these 
channels, is associated with greater idiosyncratic volatility in the stock returns of individual 
firms (Gaspar and Massa, 2006). For firms ill-prepared to deal with any decline in profitability, 
PMC ultimately increases the likelihood of liquidation (Schmidt, 1997). In combination, the 
firm-level risks of increased PMC and the exogenous nature of PMC shocks to individual firms 
place a strong emphasis on how firms navigate threats in their product market environment. 
The strategic management literature categorizes firm responses to instability in the 
external business environment along two dimensions: those based on resources and those based 
on organizational capabilities (see for example Grant, 1996). With respect to resources, Fresard 
(2010) shows that firms with large cash reserves are better able to capture market share after 
competition in product markets intensifies. Importantly, this effect is also stronger when the 
number of strategic interactions between firms is greater (Fresard, 2010), although the extent to 
which this results in a sustained competitive advantage is unclear because cash-based strategies 
are readily imitable (Barney, 1991). A relatively less imitable alternative is available to firms 
who exploit their control over human resources in response to PMC. For example, Dasgupta et 
al. (2018) find that following PMC shocks, manufacturing firms are more likely to experience 
forced CEO turnover, with subsequent improvements in both performance and productivity. 
Capability-based responses offer further alternatives for firms faced with adverse 
changes in their product market environment. For instance, Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) show 
that trade liberalization has a causal effect on firm hierarchies such that firms faced with more 
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competitive product markets adopt flatter organizational structures where CEOs have a broader 
span of control over decision making. Parallel to this, firms also appear to reduce the frequency 
with which they issue voluntary earnings forecast announcements as a result of incurring 
increased proprietary costs following a PMC shock (Huang et al., 2017). Corporate policies, 
such as the decision to invest in corporate social responsibility, can also be an effective response 
to PMC, especially when they enable incumbent firms to differentiate themselves from foreign 
competitors in the eyes of local stakeholders (Flammer, 2015). Taken together, these findings 
suggest not only that firms are aware of the threats posed by product market instability, but also 
that a number of resource- and capability-based strategic levers are available to them in response 
to such instability. 
One further possible response to product market events relates to how TMTs are 
incentivized via their compensation. I utilize findings from the literature on social comparison 
theory to argue that the degree of cooperation (versus competition) among TMT members is 
particularly important for firms faced with a PMC shock, and therefore that TMT incentive 
dispersion is a key strategic dimension of how firms respond to PMC events. SCT posits that 
the distribution of pay among top teams elicits comparisons which, in turn, affect how TMT 
members perceive their socio-political and social-psychological standing within organizations, 
and subsequently how they behave (Gartenberg and Wulf, 2017; Henderson and Fredrickson, 
2001; Ridge et al., 2017). Such comparisons have been shown to occur vertically, between 
senior executives and the CEO (Main et al., 1993); horizontally, between individuals at the same 
level in organizational hierarchies (Siegel and Hambrick, 2005); and most recently, externally, 
between TMT members and referent others from outside organizations (Ridge et al., 2017). 
Among the primary social-psychological effects of such pay comparisons is the finding that 
greater pay equality engenders perceptions of fairness among top teams (Gartenberg and Wulf, 
2017), and that this promotes cooperation and coordination between TMT members 
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(Fredrickson et al., 2010; Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001). That is, firms which wish to 
increase cooperation among top teams can at least in part do so by reducing pay dispersion. 
I argue that cooperation among TMT members is strategically advantageous because, 
among other things, it facilitates faster firm responses to instability in product markets.2 
Previous evidence suggests that firm performance improves with faster response times in highly 
dynamic environments (Boyd, 1995) and that firms which make strategic decisions quickly are 
also more effective in high velocity environments (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988). Likewise, 
product market competition presents firms with challenges which, if not met immediately, leave 
firms vulnerable to predatory strategies from rivals and new market entrants (see for instance 
Dasgupta et al., 2018). While it is certainly an option for firms to respond by generating a more 
competitive atmosphere among top teams via greater TMT incentive dispersion (Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981; Main et al., 1993), I contend that, crucially, this slows firm responses because it 
generates greater decision heterogeneity among TMTs (Steinbach et al., 2017), and is therefore 
unlikely overall to be an attractive response strategy to PMC shocks. In addition, the psychology 
literature suggests that there is a preference towards pro-social behavior when group decision-
making occurs under duress (Driskell and Salas, 1991; von Dawans et al., 2012), implying that 
a more natural response towards increased external competition is to increase internal 
cooperation. To the extent that PMC shocks pose an urgent threat, I therefore expect firms to 
behave in a manner consistent with the need to cooperate more and react quickly, which would 
be more in alignment with finding a decline in TMT incentive dispersion during periods of 
intensified PMC. This leads me to hypothesize that: 
                                                 
2 Some literature argues that dispersion among TMT, which leads to heterogeneity in decision-making, benefits the 
firm because it encourages the firm to use objective information in decision-making (Landier, Sraer & Thesmar., 
2009), enhancing internal governance (Landier, Sauvagnat, Sraer & Thesmar, 2012) and reducing the risk of 
corporate fraud (Khanna et al., 2015). These studies examine TMT dispersion in terms of the number of executives 
hired after the CEO is appointed (Landier et al., 2012) or in terms of the connectedness of the CEO and the other 
executives via past employment, education and the social organization they join (Khanna et al., 2015). However, 
the heterogeneity in decision-making can cost firms inefficiency by delaying policy implementation. 
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Hypothesis 2.1 Exogenous increases in product market competition lead to lower TMT 
incentive dispersion. 
 
2.2.2 Innovative and Diversified Firms 
Firms which place an emphasis on innovation face unique challenges. Innovation-based 
strategies oblige firms to employ specialized personnel and to develop differentiated products, 
but R&D activity often results in technological change which complicates firm planning and 
imposes additional information-processing requirements on top teams (Henderson and 
Fredrickson, 1996). Moreover, innovation requires that firms integrate activities and pool 
resources across subunits (Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996; Michel and Hambrick, 1992). This 
implies that intrafirm cooperation is pivotal for effective innovation, and therefore that 
innovativeness may magnify the need for collaboration among TMT members when firms are 
faced with increased competition (Bushman, Zhonglan, and Weining, 2016; Fredrickson et al., 
2010; Siegel and Hambrick, 2005). 
While innovation can be a key source of competitive advantage (Ettlie, 1998), it is also 
inherently risky (Hou and Robinson, 2006). Not only are investments in R&D volatile, but 
innovation-based strategies require firms to contend with uncertainties relating to the possibility 
of being pre-empted by a competitor, or realizing lower than expected market demand for 
innovations (e.g. see Kamien and Schwartz, 1974). In comparison to firms which adopt 
efficiency- or stability-based strategies, the risks associated with investment in R&D also leave 
innovative firms more vulnerable to industry downturns (Han et al., 2016). Additional to these 
external risks, R&D expenditure also puts internal management-based demands on firms. For 
example, Bushee (1998) shows that myopic CEOs sometimes use cuts in R&D spending to 
enhance short term financial performance at the expense of long term firm value. One response 
to this, which illustrates that top team pay can be used to resolve complexities in innovative 
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firms, is that compensation committees often discourage opportunistic reductions in R&D by 
more closely aligning R&D spending with CEO pay (Cheng, 2004). 
While increased PMC represents a significant deterioration in the operating market 
conditions of all incumbent firms, I argue that it is particularly harmful for more innovative 
firms. PMC increases the risk of firms experiencing lower demand for new innovations and 
product substitutability by competitors, and therefore puts an added emphasis on the need for 
top team collaboration in innovative firms. As a result, if firms do in fact use reductions in TMT 
incentive dispersion as a strategic response to PMC shocks, then I expect this relationship is 
more pronounced for more innovative firms. Specifically, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2.2 The negative effect of exogenous increases in product market 
competition on TMT incentive dispersion is amplified for more 
innovative firms. 
Business diversification is a further factor that I postulate will moderate the relationship 
between PMC and TMT incentive dispersion. While in some diversified firms (e.g. 
conglomerates) business lines can be largely independent, requiring minimal TMT coordination 
across business units (Fredrickson et al., 2010; Michel and Hambrick, 1992), others (e.g. related 
diversifiers) need greater TMT cooperation to overcome the information-processing burden 
imposed on managers by complex, varied and interdependent operations (Henderson and 
Fredrickson, 1996, 2001; Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson, 1992). Moreover, Hill et al. (1992) show 
that related diversifiers perform better under organizational structures which emphasize 
cooperation, whereas Stern and Henderson (2004) use within-business diversification to 
demonstrate that the probability of firm failure is higher for more diversified firms when 
competitors are more active bringing new products to market. Together these findings suggest 
not only that PMC might carry additional risks for more diversified firms, but also that strategic 
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responses like lowering TMT incentive dispersion, which promote intrafirm cooperation, might 
be particularly viable for at least some highly diversified firms. 
It is also possible that TMT incentive dispersion increases with the level of business 
diversification, if for example, more diversified firms have relatively fewer business units 
exposed to competitive shocks, and therefore subsequently, a lower need for cooperative top 
teams when responding to competitive pressures. However, this is implausible in the context of 
large firm-exogenous competition shocks. I measure PMC using large-scale import tariff 
reductions which are at least three times the median reduction during my sample period (Huang 
et al., 2017). The majority of these tariff cuts result from multilateral trade agreements which 
have a broad impact across firms in multiple industries, and for thousands of individual products 
(Flammer, 2015; Huang et al., 2017). To the extent that competition shocks are driven by large-
scale multilateral trade agreements, it is unlikely that more diversified businesses experience 
localized impacts from PMC. In fact, I argue that, in response to PMC, the need for cooperation 
and hence for lower TMT incentive dispersion is relatively larger for more diversified firms 
because of the information-processing demands on managers (Henderson and Fredrickson, 
1996), and the risks associated with poor strategic response choices (Stern and Henderson, 
2004). Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2.3 The negative effect of exogenous increases in product market competition 




To test my hypotheses I collect data on manufacturing firms (SIC 200-399) included in 
the S&P 1500 between 1992 and 2014, and set up a quasi-natural experiment where treated 
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firms, which experience a PMC shock, are matched on a number of characteristics with control 
firms that do not. This allows me to observe a total of 384 firm-level competition shocks across 
55 three-digit manufacturing sectors during the period. I consider TMT incentive dispersion 
among the five most senior executives in each firm, including the CEO (e.g. as in Steinbach et 
al., 2017), and restrict my sample to only include instances where there is no CEO turnover 
during a fiscal year. Overall, including both treated and control firms, my full sample comprises 
11,452 firm-year observations. Data on executives’ compensation and ownership are collated 
from Execucomp and ISS Incentive Lab, and firm financial and corporate governance data are 
from Compustat. 
 
2.3.2 TMT Incentive Dispersion and PMC 
I capture TMT incentive dispersion using several measures to ensure that my results 
accurately reflect multiple dimensions of executive compensation which might influence 
cooperation among TMT members. First, I follow Steinbach et al. (2017) and consider the total 
incentive-based compensation TMT members receive as a proportion of their overall 
compensation. To do this I calculate the cumulative value of both new and previously awarded 
stock options, restricted stock, and long-term performance plans, and then divide this by total 
compensation, calculated as incentive-based compensation plus salary and bonuses. Option 
values for my sample are derived using the modified Black-Scholes present value method 
available via Execucomp and restricted stock is valued at the prevailing common stock price for 
each firm (Fredrickson et al., 2010). Next, I adapt my measure of total incentive-based 
compensation to isolate the component which can be directly linked with equity only, excluding 
accounting-based long-term performance plans. I therefore also calculate the proportion of 
equity-based compensation TMT members receive as the ratio between stock options plus 
restricted stock granted, and total compensation. 
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Recent evidence further suggests that dispersion in pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) 
also reflects aspects of how firms use TMT compensation to incentivize coordination and effort 
among TMT members by optimizing executive pay (Bushman et al., 2016). PPS offers a more 
direct measure of the change in executive incentives when firm value changes, and is defined as 
the dollar change in granted incentives corresponding to a one percent change in firm value, 
standardized by total compensation. I therefore follow Bushman et al. (2016) and capture PPS 
as in Equation 2.1: 
𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑗
=




is the PPS for firm 𝑗, where share and option totals are from Execucomp, deltas are estimated 
using the approach outlined in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), stock prices are the prevailing 
ordinary equity price at the time of observing PPS, and total compensation is comprised of 
salary, bonuses, and incentive-based compensation. 
For each of my total incentive-based, equity-based, and PPS dependent variables, I 
measure dispersion using both gini coefficients (GINI) and coefficients of variation (CV) to 
ensure that my results are robust in either case (Fredrickson et al., 2010; Siegel and Hambrick, 
2005; Steinbach et al., 2017). I define GINI as in Steinbach et al. (2017) such that: 






(𝑦1 + 2𝑦2 + ⋯ + 𝑛𝑦𝑛) (2.2) 
is the gini coefficient for firm 𝑗, with 𝑛 TMT members, where 𝑦𝑖 is the proportion of total-
incentive based compensation, equity-based compensation, or PPS of executive 𝑖, in descending 
order, and ?̅? is the mean TMT compensation ratio. A GINI of zero signals perfect equality (i.e. 
nil dispersion) in compensation, whereas a GINI of one signals complete inequality in 
compensation among executives. CV is defined as the ratio between the standard deviation of 
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TMT compensation and mean TMT compensation for a given firm (Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 
1990; Siegel and Hambrick, 2005). Higher CV values represent greater TMT incentive 
dispersion. 
Since I am interested in the firm-level effects of PMC on TMT incentives, my main 
independent variable of interest is Tariff Cut. Large tariff cuts, which I define as those which 
are at least three times the median U.S. import tariff reduction between 1994 and 2011 
(Dasgupta et al., 2018), are widely used to proxy for the exogenous shocks which firms 
encounter in product markets (e.g. Flammer, 2015; Fresard, 2010; Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010; 
Huang et al., 2017). To evaluate my primary hypothesis, that exogenous increases in PMC are 
associated with lower TMT incentive dispersion, I therefore follow the literature and 
operationalize Tariff Cut as a dummy equal to one for firms which are in industries that 
experience a large tariff reduction, and zero otherwise (Fresard, 2010; Huang et al., 2017). 
 
2.3.3 The Moderating Effects of Innovation and Diversification 
I further hypothesize that the relationship between PMC and TMT incentive dispersion 
might be exacerbated by certain firm-specific characteristics which potentially impose a greater 
need for collaboration and cooperation among TMT members. Specifically, my second 
hypothesis posits that the negative effect of exogenous increases in PMC on TMT incentive 
dispersion is stronger for more innovative firms. I proxy for the moderating effect of firm 
innovativeness by generating Innovative, a variable calculated as the ratio between firm R&D 
expenditure and total number of employees (e.g. as in Hill and Snell, 1988). 
Similarly, I expect that the negative effect of PMC on TMT incentive dispersion is also 
stronger for more diversified firms. Therefore, to test for the moderating effect of firm-level 
diversification, I follow Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) and calculate Diversified, a count 




Prior research shows that a number of financial and corporate governance characteristics 
might also influence the distribution of pay among TMT members at the firm level, including 
in particular as firms respond to product market events. I therefore include a number of controls 
in my models to account for this. Fresard (2010) shows that cash policy has a substantial 
strategic dimension, allowing firms to grow their market share at the expense of competitors 
following a product market shock. Larger cash balances may therefore provide firms with an 
alternative response to PMC, and possibly a reduced incentive to use TMT compensation as a 
strategic lever during PMC. Hence, I control for firm cash holdings as a proportion of firm total 
assets (Cash). Some studies report significantly larger executive pay differentials for larger, 
more profitable firms (e.g. Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001; Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). 
Better performance and larger firm resources may influence TMT incentive dispersion in some 
firms, so I also control for Firm size, the natural logarithm of firm total assets, and firm 
profitability, as measured by industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA). Additionally, I follow 
Bebchuk et al. (2011) and Dasgupta et al. (2018) and control for industry-adjusted Tobin’s q as 
a further market-to-book based measure of firm performance. My remaining firm financial 
controls account for differences in firm risk and leverage because riskier firms with larger debt 
burdens can be particularly constrained during PMC (Huang et al., 2017). Specifically, I control 
for Leverage, calculated as the ratio between long-term debt and firm total assets (Bebchuk et 
al., 2011), and Firm risk, the standard deviation of monthly stock returns (Karuna, 2007). 
A number of corporate governance characteristics may similarly affect TMT incentive 
dispersion at the firm level. For instance, CEOs with longer employment tenure may be better 
able to shape firm compensation structures (Fredrickson et al., 2010; Ridge et al., 2017). 
Powerful CEOs, who simultaneously chair the board of directors, can also exert greater 
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influence over strategic decisions, including those on executive pay (Adams, Almeida, and 
Ferreira, 2005). In addition to this, significant stockownership also affords insiders similar 
control benefits (Bebchuk et al., 2011; Steinbach et al., 2017). I therefore include controls for 
CEO tenure, the number of years a CEO has held their position, Insider ownership, the fraction 
of shares owned by insiders, and CEO duality, a dummy equal to one for firms whose CEO is 
also chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. My final governance control is Number of VPs, 
defined as the number of vice presidents within the TMT, because CEO-like executives can 
similarly exercise influence over executive pay decisions (Bebchuk et al., 2011; Henderson and 
Fredrickson, 2001). 
Finally I also include firm and year fixed effects in my models to control for unobserved 
firm-specific characteristics and any trend in TMT incentive dispersion over time which might 
affect my results (Huang et al., 2017). 
 
2.3.5 Supplementary analyses 
Although my primary analyses utilize several distinct measures of TMT incentive 
dispersion, each measure is related to the spread in absolute, dollar-based compensation among 
TMT members. However, it is also possible that other aspects of executive compensation, in 
addition to overall pay, create opportunities for social comparisons among executives, and in 
turn, impact on TMT collaboration and cooperation. For instance, recent research by 
Albuquerque, Carter, and Lynch (2018) notes the trend of rising complexity in executive 
compensation contracts over time. This might mean that while executives in some TMTs are 
receiving relatively equal overall pay, they may at the same time be subject to mixed levels of 
compensation complexity. If this places executives on comparatively more stable salary-based 
contracts together with others who, for example, receive a larger proportion of their 
compensation via individual awards, then I argue that this too can be a basis for social 
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comparison within TMTs, with some executives required to work harder to achieve equal pay 
or to accept greater proportions of increasingly variable and complex pay. Therefore, if firms 
do in fact use TMT incentive dispersion as a strategic lever following PMC shocks, then I also 
expect PMC to be associated with reduced dispersion in compensation complexity and lower 
overall use of individually derived performance compensation. 
To address this I look at both individual performance awards (IPAs) and overall 
compensation complexity. I capture the level of IPA compensation using two measures. First, I 
use a dummy equal to one for firms which grant IPAs to at least one executive during a fiscal 
year, and zero otherwise. Second, I measure the percentage of IPA compensation executives 
receive as a proportion of their total compensation, and then use the TMT median IPA 
percentage to represent the rate of firm-level IPA. 
Next I use three measures to capture the dispersion of compensation complexity. First, I 
capture the CV of complexity indices calculated for all TMT members in each firm, where each 
index is based on the number of components which feed into possible final pay and the number 
of conditions imposed on each component for each executive (Albuquerque et al., 2018).3 
Second, I consider the CV of TMT compensation diversity, calculated as one minus the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of each executive’s incentive components as a proportion 
of total compensation: 






  (2.3) 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the diversity of compensation for executive 𝑖 in year 𝑡, and each 
component of total compensation is either salary, cash bonuses, non-equity incentives, option 
                                                 
3 For short- and long-term cash bonuses, restricted stock, and stock options, I allocate index points for each 
incentive component with a time condition (up to a maximum of 4), and assign additional index points if the award 
has absolute (or relative) performance conditions based on more than one performance objective or on more than 
one time period (up to a maximum of 24). 
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awards, stock awards, deferred compensation, or other compensation. Third, I count the number 
of incentive components individual executives receive and capture dispersion in this measure 
using standard deviation.4 
I conclude my supplementary analyses with difference-in-difference (DiD) t-tests 
examining the financial performance of the treated firms in my matched sample against that of 
my control firms. Specifically, I calculate Tobin’s q for both groups for the three years preceding 
and then the three years following large tariff cuts, and compare changes in q around this period 
as firms vary in their level of TMT incentive dispersion and their exposure to the product market 
shock.  
 
2.3.6 Estimation Procedure 
I follow prior research and apply propensity scored matched difference-in-differences 
(PSM-DiD) regressions to examine the effect of large tariff cuts on the TMT incentive 
dispersion of firms in my sample (Flammer, 2015). Large-scale tariff cuts are generally 
considered outside the control of individual firms, even if firms exert lobbying effort during 
trade negotiations (Flammer, 2015; Huang et al., 2017). Large tariff cuts therefore present a 
plausibly exogenous shock at the level of individual firms, around which I construct my DiD 
models to alleviate any potential endogeneity in my estimations. Moreover, to account for 
possible differences in the characteristics of treated and control firms, I match treated firms, 
which experience a tariff cut, with control firms using nearest neighbor propensity scores based 
on five variables. These include TMT incentive dispersion, firm size, profitability, leverage, and 
firm risk. There are 299 firms that experience large tariff reductions during my sample period 
and I lose more observations due to matching process thresholds not being met (with the calipher 
                                                 
4 I include short- and long-term cash bonuses, restricted stock, stock options, unit cash, phantom stocks, reload 
options, and stock appreciation rights. 
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set at 1%). The end result is that I have less than 600 firm observations when combining the 
treatment and control groups. I then estimate the following regression: 
∆𝑇𝑀𝑇 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾′𝑿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(2.4) 
where ∆𝑇𝑀𝑇 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the difference between three-year average incentive 
dispersion following large tariff cuts and three-year average incentive dispersion prior to large 
tariff cuts for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡, and where these averages are either based on total-incentive, 
equity-only, or PPS dimensions of compensation. 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 is a dummy equal to one for 
firms which experience a large tariff cut in year 𝑡 − 1, and zero otherwise, 𝑿𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of 
lagged controls, 𝜃𝑖 and 𝜃𝑡 are firm and year fixed effects respectively, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
Each of the matching variables is included as a control in 𝑿𝑖,𝑡−1 and robust standard errors are 
clustered at the three-digit SIC level in each regression. The coefficient I am interested in is 𝛽, 
which captures the direction and significance of the difference in 
∆𝑇𝑀𝑇 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 between treated and control firms. 
I further build on my baseline regression in order to examine hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3. 
Specifically I extend the model in Equation 2.4 to include moderation terms which interact my 
Tariff Cut dummy with first my Innovative ratio, and then separately my Diversified count. My 
analyses conclude with my robustness tests where I examine the effect of tariff cuts on the 
dispersion in TMT compensation complexity and individual performance awards. 
 
2.4 Results 
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for my measures of 
TMT incentive dispersion as well as all control variables. Although my GINI and CV measures 
for some of the independent variables are highly correlated, I note that this is not always 
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necessarily the case. For example, the correlation between PPSGINI and PPSCV is only 0.44, 
suggesting at least some variation in the information captured by each measure. Moreover, in 
tests not presented here, I also note that my results are not likely subject to multicollinearity 
concerns since variance inflation factors in my regressions do not exceed 5. 
In Table 2.2 I report preliminary results from univariate tests for mean differences 
between my treatment and control firms both in terms of their absolute level of TMT incentive 
dispersion, and the change in pre- versus post-tariff cut TMT incentive dispersion. Consistent 
with Hypothesis 2.1, which predicts that exogenous increases in product market competition 
lead to lower firm TMT incentive dispersion, I find that aggregate incentive dispersion is 
significantly lower (at the 1% level) for firms in industries subject to large tariff cuts for both 
my measures of total and equity-only incentive compensation. Moreover, while total and equity 
incentive dispersion both decrease around tariff cuts for treated firms (GINITotal and GINIEquity 
= -0.0093), they actually increase for my control sample over the same time period (GINITotal = 
0.0551 and GINIEquity = 0.0533). This difference is again significant at the 1% level, and each 
of these results holds equally for my CV measure of incentive dispersion. However, I see no 
significant differences between my treated and control firms both in terms of their level and 
changes in PPS dispersion. 
Table 2.3 presents the pre-trend test of the dependent variables. I do not find any 
statistically-significant difference between the dependent variables of the treatment and control 
firms, which confirms that the levels of TMT incentive dispersions of the treatment and control 
firms after matching process before large tariff reductions are not different.  
In Table 2.4 I further evaluate Hypothesis 2.1 using my sample of matched firms and 
DiD regressions which control for a number of financial and corporate governance 
characteristics. As predicted, the coefficient on Tariff cut is negative and significant across each 
of my specifications, supporting Hypothesis 2.1. For example, when using GINI to capture the 
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change in total-incentive based compensation I find that tariff cuts are associated with a 
significant reduction in the spread of TMT incentives (b = -0.0364; p < 0.05). This result persists 
if I use CV instead of GINI, and if I look at equity-based incentives only or pay-performance 
sensitivity instead of total-incentives. Together, these results suggest that multiple dimensions 
of TMT incentive dispersion converge in firms exposed to increased competition following an 
exogenous product market shock, consistent with Hypothesis 2.1.
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Table 2.1  Descriptive statistics and correlationsa,b 
Variable Mean SD  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Total incentive dispersion (Gini) 0.05 0.24              
2 Total incentive dispersion (CV) 0.14 0.63  0.96            
3 Equity incentive dispersion (Gini) 0.05 0.24  0.99 0.95           
4 Equity incentive dispersion (CV) 0.13 0.64  0.95 0.99 0.96          
5 PPS dispersion (Gini) 0.01 0.25  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03         
6 PPS dispersion (CV) 0.01 0.45  0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.44        
7 IPA (Dummy)# 0.04 0.41  0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02       
8 IPA (%) 0.00 0.04  0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.70      
9 Complexity dispersion (CV) 0.00 0.14  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.08 -0.03 -0.01     
10 Complexity dispersion (Diversity) -0.01 0.16  0.21 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.02 0.23 -0.01 -0.01 0.21    
11 Complexity dispersion (SD) -0.01 0.52  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.10 -0.04 -0.01 0.38 0.16   
12 Cash 0.11 0.11  0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.04 0.00 0.02  
13 Firm size 7.07 1.57  0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.10 -0.06 0.06 -0.04 -0.30 
14 Leverage 0.17 0.15  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.34 
15 ROA 0.00 0.09  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.10 
16 Firm risk 0.12 0.06  -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.30 
17 Tobin's q 0.31 1.30  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.24 
18 CEO duality## 0.59 0.49  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.07 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.02 -0.18 
19 CEO tenure 6.94 6.73  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.05 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.04 
20 Insider ownership 0.04 0.09  -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.03 
21 Number of VPs 2.60 1.19  0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.06 
 
Variable Mean SD  13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
14 Leverage 0.17 0.15  0.26        
15 ROA 0.00 0.09  0.20 -0.09       
16 Firm risk 0.12 0.06  -0.37 -0.06 -0.31      
17 Tobin's q 0.31 1.30  -0.09 -0.17 0.28 0.14     
18 CEO duality# 0.59 0.49  0.20 0.07 0.10 -0.15 -0.01    
19 CEO tenure 6.94 6.73  -0.14 -0.07 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.14   
20 Insider ownership 0.04 0.09  -0.22 -0.09 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.37  
21 Number of VPs 2.60 1.19  -0.12 -0.01 0.01 0.08 0.04 -0.05 0.01 -0.17 
a n = 11,439 for all variables except those which proxy for IPA and Compensation complexity dispersion, where n = 5,620. 
b All correlations greater than 0.02 in absolute value are statistically significant at the 5% level (except for those which relate to IPA and compensation complexity 
dispersion, which are statistically significant at 5% when greater than 0.03 in absolute value). 
# 1 = Firm grants IPAs to at least one executive; 0 = Firm grants no IPAs. 
## 1 = CEO is also chairman of the board; 0 = CEO is not chairman. 
31 
Table 2.2  Univariate analyses contrasting TMT incentive differences between treatment firms which experience tariff cuts and control firms 




PPS dispersion  
Δ Total incentive 
dispersion 
Δ Equity incentive 
dispersion 
Δ PPS dispersion 
 GINI CV GINI CV GINI CV  GINI CV GINI CV GINI CV 
              
A: Treatment firms experiencing large tariff cuts      
Mean 0.2147 0.5098 0.2286 0.5493 0.3507 1.1646  -0.0093 0.0125 -0.0093 0.0068 0.0166 -0.0078 
SD 0.2066 0.5377 0.2127 0.5489 0.2459 0.4829  0.1798 0.4680 0.1851 0.4749 0.2620 0.4628 
Obs. 343 382 343 380 312 333  325 347 326 347 301 315 
              
B: Control firms not experiencing large tariff cuts      
Mean 0.2892 0.6797 0.2952 0.6989 0.3738 1.2024  0.0551 0.1392 0.0533 0.1340 0.0050 0.0150 
SD 0.2584 0.6733 0.2573 0.6694 0.2491 0.4829  0.2396 0.6387 0.2405 0.6405 0.2504 0.4462 
Obs. 12,060 13,314 12,038 13,275 11,215 12,091  11,127 12,032 11,113 12,005 9,694 10,412 
              
              
A – B -0.0745*** -0.1700*** -0.0666*** -0.1496*** -0.0231 -0.0378  -0.0645*** -0.1267*** -0.0626*** -0.1272*** 0.0116 -0.0228 
S.E. (0.0141) (0.0348) (0.0140) (0.0347) (0.0143) (0.0268)  (0.0134) (0.0346) (0.0134) (0.0347) (0.0147) (0.0255) 
              
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 2.3  Pre-trend test 
 Treatment firms 
 Control firms Diff in 
mean 
 
 Mean SD 
 Mean SD S.E. 
TMT total incentive dispersion (GINI) 0.2101 0.1677  0.1967 0.1654 0.0134 0.0146 
TMT total incentive dispersion (CV) 0.4631 0.4034  0.4543 0.3907 0.0088 0.0354 
TMT Equity incentive dispersion (GINI) 0.2201 0.1663  0.2117 0.1640 0.0084 0.0147 




Table 2.4  PSM-DiD regressions modeling the effects of tariff cuts on TMT incentive dispersiona 
 Δ Total incentive 
dispersion 
 
Δ Equity incentive 
dispersion 
 Δ PPS dispersion 
Variable GINI CV  GINI CV  GINI CV 
         
Tariff cut -0.0364** -0.0691**  -0.0266** -0.0540*  -0.0442** -0.0900* 
 (0.0169) (0.0276)  (0.0126) (0.029)  (0.0189) (0.0472) 
         
Lagged dep. variable -0.9825*** -1.1800***  -1.1384*** -1.1888***  -1.2670*** -0.9418*** 
 (0.1826) (0.0873)  (0.0909) (0.074)  (0.1080) (0.1121) 
         
Lagged firm financial controls:       
         
Cash 0.8809*** 1.3934  0.6206 1.5570  -0.5794 -0.2481 
 (0.3320) (1.0394)  (0.4734) (1.1576)  (0.4643) (1.0704) 
         
Firm size 0.0459 -0.0744  -0.0260 -0.0276  -0.1121* 0.0128 
 (0.0655) (0.1063)  (0.0453) (0.1176)  (0.0574) (0.1376) 
         
Leverage 0.2234 -0.0381  0.1672 0.2214  0.0184 0.6028 
 (0.2638) (0.4076)  (0.1651) (0.4351)  (0.2331) (0.4654) 
         
ROA -0.4896 -0.3134  -0.0058 -0.0711  0.1988 2.3845*** 
 (0.4421) (0.6982)  (0.2840) (0.7140)  (0.3543) (0.8279) 
         
Firm risk 0.5154 -4.0470**  -2.0316** -3.7129**  -0.2149 1.1967 
 (0.6201) (1.6411)  (0.7864) (1.7630)  (0.8158) (1.7126) 
         
Tobin’s q -0.0229 -0.1316***  -0.0579*** -0.1358***  0.0478* 0.0246 
 (0.0142) (0.0500)  (0.0197) (0.0515)  (0.0257) (0.0715) 
         
Lagged corporate governance controls:       
         
CEO duality 0.0779 0.1451*  0.0596 0.1161  0.0952 0.1111 
 (0.0538) (0.0870)  (0.0464) (0.0952)  (0.0614) (0.0813) 
         
CEO tenure -0.0005 0.0017  -0.0007 -0.0073  0.0178 -0.0197 
 (0.0056) (0.0218)  (0.0082) (0.0218)  (0.0108) (0.0247) 
         
CEO tenure2 0.0003 0.0009  0.0005 0.0011  -0.0007** 0.0004 
 (0.0004) (0.0013)  (0.0005) (0.0013)  (0.0004) (0.0012) 
         
Insider ownership 0.6172 8.3610*  3.5853* 8.3725*  -1.2266 1.1970 
 (0.8332) (4.9468)  (1.9057) (4.4865)  (0.9767) (2.9061) 
         
Insider ownership2 1.0130 -15.0383  -6.8387 -15.3806  0.0212 1.0916 
 (2.4631) (12.5853)  (4.9514) (11.5331)  (1.8499) (6.7499) 
         
Number of VPs 0.0200 0.1632***  0.0592*** 0.1514***  0.0298 -0.0585 
 (0.0157) (0.0427)  (0.0191) (0.0430)  (0.0286) (0.0393) 
         
Constant -0.1820 -0.0595  -0.0759 -0.5814  1.4124*** 1.3938 
 (0.4980) (1.8987)  (0.8055) (1.9593)  (0.4224) (1.1393) 
         
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.607 0.737  0.704 0.755  0.736 0.633 
Obs. 502 502  502 502  480 502 
         
a Robust standard errors clustered by three-digit SIC are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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To test Hypothesis 2.2, which predicts that the negative effect of exogenous increases 
in product market competition on TMT incentive dispersion will be stronger for more innovative 
firms, Table 2.5 contains regressions which use my Innovative variable to moderate the effect 
of tariff cuts on my measures of TMT incentive dispersion. As I predict, the interaction 
coefficient is negative and significant (e.g. when using GINI to capture total incentives, b = -
0.0060; p < 0.05), across each of my regressions except in the case where I use CV to measure 
total incentive dispersion. Figure 2.1 contains a plot of the interaction. While total incentive 
dispersion in low innovation firms appears flat to moderately increasing, high innovation firms 
experience a sharp decline in incentive dispersion following a tariff cut, supporting Hypothesis 
2.2. 
Finally, I examine Hypothesis 2.3, that the negative effect of exogenous increases in 
product market competition on TMT incentive dispersion will be stronger for more diversified 
firms. Table 2.5 shows regressions using my Diversified variable to moderate the effect of tariff 
cuts on my measures of TMT incentive dispersion. As predicted, the coefficient on the 
interaction term is negative and significant (e.g. when using GINI to capture total incentives, b 
= -0.0189; p < 0.05), across each of my regressions except in the case where I use CV to measure 
pay-performance sensitivity. Figure 2.2 illustrates a plot of the interaction. While total incentive 
dispersion in relatively under-diversified firms is lower prior to a tariff cut, this relationship 
reverses following tariff cuts such that highly diversified firms experience a sharp decline in, 
and lower overall incentive dispersion following a tariff cut, consistent with Hypothesis 2.3.
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Table 2.5  Moderating effects of innovation and business diversification on the relationship between large tariff cuts and TMT incentive dispersion 
  
Δ Total incentive 
dispersion 
Δ Equity Incentive 
dispersion 
Δ PPS 
Δ Total incentive 
dispersion 
Δ Equity Incentive 
dispersion 
Δ PPS 
Variable GINI CV GINI CV GINI CV GINI CV GINI CV GINI CV 
  
            
Innovative × 
Tariff cut 
-0.0060** 0.0023 -0.0096* -0.0207** -0.0141* -0.0054**       
 (0.0029) (0.0089) (0.0052) (0.0082) (0.0078) (0.0025)       
             
Diversified × 
Tariff cut 
      -0.0189** -0.0308** -0.0167* -0.0340** -0.0931*** -0.0110 
       (0.0087) (0.0139) (0.0087) (0.0143) (0.0316) (0.0112) 
             
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Main effects# Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.892 0.824 0.872 0.888 0.797 0.912 0.805 0.817 0.797 0.791 0.946 0.791 
Observations 244 226 280 218 250 250 446 336 446 350 280 336 
 
            
Robust standard errors clustered by three-digit SIC are in parentheses. 
# Main effects are Tariff cut, and Innovative and Diversified, which are respectively only included in the models where they are used to moderate the relationship between 
tariff cuts and TMT incentive dispersion. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 2.2  Moderating effect of diversification on the relationship between large tariff cuts and TMT incentive 
dispersion 
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2.5 Supplementary results 
I further examine if other aspects of TMT compensation react similarly to tariff cuts in 
line with my results on the spread in absolute, dollar-based compensation among TMT 
members. Table 2.6 contains models where the dependent variables are measures for differences 
in the use of individual performance awards (IPAs) and the dispersion of compensation 
complexity. The results show that firms reduce their use of IPAs and also significantly reduce 
the dispersion in compensation contract complexity among TMT members following tariff cuts. 
For instance, I find that tariff cuts are associated with a significantly lower incidence of firms 
using complex compensation when complexity is measured as the standard deviation of the 
number of incentive packages offered to executives (b = -0.1538; p < 0.05). These results offer 
additional support for Hypothesis 2.1, showing that exogenous increases in product market 
competition not only lead to lower dollar-based TMT incentive dispersion, but also lower 
dispersion of compensation complexity and a reduced use of individual awards. 
 
Table 2.6  Robustness tests for the relationship between large tariff cuts and TMT compensation complexity 
 
Δ Individual performance 
awards  
Δ Dispersion of compensation  
contract complexity 
Variable Dummy Percentage  Index CV Diversity Incentives SD 
       
Tariff Cut -0.1018*** -0.0072**  -0.0554* -0.0242*** -0.1538** 
 (0.0284) (0.0029)  (0.0300) (0.0078) (0.0600) 
       
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE SIC3 SIC3  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
PSM No No  Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.282 0.223  0.758 0.584 0.878 
Observations 2,670 5,808  146 470 190 
       




Although my results suggest that product market competition is linked with decreased 
TMT incentive dispersion, it is not clear to what extent this relationship benefits firms. To shed 
some light on this question I use my matched sample to perform auxiliary analyses which 
examine changes in the financial performance of treated versus control firms around tariff cut 
events. Specifically, I look at changes in three-year Tobin’s q for firms which reduce TMT 
incentive dispersion by relatively more and contrast this difference against control firms from 
my matched sample. The results, which compare firms in the first and third terciles for 
reductions in TMT incentive dispersion, suggest that treated firms, which reduce TMT incentive 
dispersion most, perform significantly better than matched control firms with similar 
characteristics over the same time period (see Table 2.7). For instance, when TMT incentive 
dispersion is measured using GINI of total incentives, I find that q is significantly larger for 
firms which reduce dispersion by more following a tariff cut (Δq = 0.4071, p < 0.05), and that 
this difference is also significantly larger relative to the corresponding difference for my set of 
control firms (Δq = 0.3847, p < 0.01). This latter DiD result remains significant if I capture total 
incentive dispersion using CV, or if I look at either equity-only incentives or pay-performance 
sensitivity. Finally, I note that for total- and equity-only incentives, q improves monotonically 
across terciles as firms make greater reductions in TMT incentive dispersion. Overall, these 
results suggest that firm value is related to incentive dispersion such that firms which experience 
greater reductions in the spread of TMT incentives following a product market shock 
subsequently perform better. 
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Table 2.7  The effect of reduced incentive dispersion on firm performance# 
Incentive Terciles 
Δ Tobin’s q 




















     
1st 0.2749 -0.0481 0.2991 -0.0487 
2nd  0.1471 0.1013 0.1577 -0.0061 
3rd  -0.1322 -0.0705 -0.1679 -0.1050 
     
     
1st - 3rd 0.4071** 0.0224 0.4670** 0.0563 
S.E. (0.1830) (0.1056) (0.1833) (0.1541) 
     
     
T-C## 0.3847*** 0.4107*** 
S.E. (0.0239) (0.0282) 






















     
1st 0.3441 -0.0505 0.3428 -0.0167 
2nd  0.0986 -0.0052 0.1639 -0.0697 
3rd  -0.1464 -0.1031 -0.2033 -0.0710 
     
     
1st - 3rd 0.4905*** 0.0526 0.5461*** 0.0543 
S.E. (0.1808) (0.1529) (0.1816) (0.1574) 
     
     
T-C## 0.4379*** 0.4918*** 
S.E. (0.0272) (0.0281) 













     
1st -0.2220 -0.4042 0.0432 -0.1320 
2nd  -0.0758 -0.2043 0.2258 -0.0197 
3rd  -0.1726 -0.2917 0.1077 0.0169 
     
     
1st - 3rd -0.0494 -0.1125 -0.0645 -0.1489 
S.E. (0.1639) (0.1731) (0.1654) (0.1033) 
     
     
T-C## 0.0631** 0.0844*** 
S.E. (0.0268) (0.0221) 
     
# Values represent the difference in Tobin’s q after a Tariff cut (3-year average q after a Tariff cut minus 3-year 
average q before a Tariff cut) in the first, second and third  terciles of changes in TMT incentive dispersion after a 
Tariff cut (3-year average TMT incentive dispersion after a Tariff cut minus 3-year average TMT incentive 
dispersion before a Tariff cut). The sample in this table is the same as the matched sample in Table 2.3. 
## Treatment – Control. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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2.6 Discussion 
This study examines whether firms use TMT incentive dispersion as a strategic lever in 
response to exogenous changes in product market competition. I extend existing research on 
social comparison theory that shows reduced incentive dispersion increases TMT cooperative 
behavior to argue that firms faced with greater PMC also have an incentive to reduce TMT 
incentive dispersion because fostering improved cooperation among TMT members will enable 
firms to respond more quickly to external threats. I test my prediction on a large sample of 
manufacturing firms using PSM-DiD regressions, which allow me to isolate the causal effect of 
PMC on TMT incentive dispersion, and find support for this reasoning. Tariff cuts are associated 
with significantly lower dispersion in several TMT incentive measures, including total- and 
equity-only incentives, and pay-performance sensitivity. Moreover, I find lower TMT incentive 
dispersion is subsequently associated with increased firm value relative to peer firms. These 
results are consistent with the notion that firms can use the spread of compensation among 
executives as a strategic tool when managing threats in their operational environment, 
supporting and even increasing firm value relative to peers who do not. 
My results add to the literature on TMT incentives and social comparison theory (e.g. 
Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson et al., 2010). In particular, I show not only that 
firms can use the distribution of incentives among TMT members strategically, but also that this 
can occur in response to firm-exogenous stimuli such as increased PMC. This finding 
complements existing studies on SCT, which emphasize the role of interpersonal dynamics 
among TMT members within firms (Gartenberg and Wulf, 2017; Ridge et al., 2017), and 
suggests that SCT might have utility beyond this context because some firms also act in line 
with SCT when managing their responses to external events.  
In addition, I further theorize and show that my results are particularly relevant for more 
innovative and more diversified firms. Prior research shows that innovative and diversified firms 
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generally operate in more dynamic market segments (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988), place 
added information processing requirements on TMTs (Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996), and 
as a result, have particular need for coordinated and cooperative TMTs (Bushman et al., 2016; 
Hill et al., 1992; Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Siegel and Hambrick, 2005). Such firms are 
therefore potentially more vulnerable to PMC shocks, and consequently have greater need for 
coordinated decision making and quick strategic responses to outside threats. Indeed, I find that 
innovative and diversified firms are more likely to undertake greater reductions in TMT 
incentive dispersion, consistent with my argument that these firms are among those which stand 
to gain the most from cooperative and coordinated executives when confronted with a more 
competitive product market. 
One limitation of my study is that I am unable to observe and aggregate the firm-specific 
mechanisms by which individual firms implement lower TMT incentive dispersion. That is, 
while I take several measures of TMT incentive dispersion, each is an outcome of internal firm 
processes (e.g. compensation committee meetings), for which data are not readily available, but 
which may result in differences in executive compensation amounts and items across firms. To 
at least partially address this, my supplementary analyses examine measures of compensation 
complexity based on the use of individual performance awards and the dispersion in overall 
compensation complexity, captured as a function of the number of compensation components 
offered at a firm level (Albuquerque et al., 2018). Consistent with my main results on incentive-
based pay and pay-performance sensitivity, I find that firms also look to reduce differences 
among executives in terms of their compensation complexity following a PMC shock. These 
results suggest it is unlikely that there are any significant firm-specific differences in executive 
compensation not captured in my empirics. 
Finally, I pose that TMT incentive dispersion is only one strategic lever available to 
firms as they face tariff reductions and subsequently increased competitive pressures. For 
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instance, Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) show that competition stemming from trade liberalization 
also leads firms to flatten their corporate hierarchies, while Flammer (2015) demonstrates that 
firms can respond by increasing their engagement in CSR. Future research could therefore 
examine the interplay between TMT incentive dispersion and other characteristics of 
organizational design, which firms use strategically following PMC shocks, to integrate and 
advance my understanding of whether compensation and other policies work in unison as 
complements of one another, or as substitutes for one another. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This article investigates how increased product market competition affects TMT 
incentive dispersion. Using large tariff cuts to identify exogenous changes in competition, I 
build on the social comparison perspective of TMT compensation to extend my understanding 
of how firms react to adverse events in their operating environment and the role of TMT 
incentives. My results show that firms use the spread of compensation to incentivize cooperation 
among executives during periods of increased competition, consistent with my expectation that 
firms need to respond with urgency to new market entrants, and in turn that this is associated 
with increased firm value. These findings have important implications for both researchers and 
practitioners. Most notably, my findings suggest that the internal distribution of incentives 
among executives, and the subsequent interpersonal implications for TMTs, can be strategically 
used by firms in response to external markets. 
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Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are the most dominant decision-makers within firms. 
Firms empower CEOs in order to reduce communication costs and improve operating efficiency 
so that they can promptly respond to uncertainty (Nickell, 1996; Schmidt, 1997). CEOs, 
however, have a personal incentive to utilize their power for private benefits rather than 
shareholder value (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004). Moreover, powerful 
CEOs are generally associated with weak corporate governance (Bebchuk et al., 2009, 2011; 
Khanna et al., 2015) such that it is difficult to mitigate this agency issue with internal governance 
mechanisms. In this case, can product market competition play an external role in disciplining 
CEO power? Casual observations indicate this possibility. Consider Facebook, seemingly a 
monopoly that dominates the social media market. Its founder and the CEO, Mr. Zuckerberg, 
remains in his position even after the Cambridge Analytica Scandal.  In contrast, the co-founder 
and former CEO, Mr. Kalanick, of Uber, a leader in the competitive ride-sharing service market, 
was forced to resign in June 2017 due to discrimination issues in the organization and following 
the #DeleteUber campaign. These two examples suggest that CEOs of firms that face more 
direct competition, such as in the case of Uber, may savor less power. In this study, I formalize 
this idea to establish my primary hypothesis that product market competition (PMC) shapes 
CEO power. 
CEO dominance, on the one hand, is subject to agency costs that reduces firm value (Liu 
and Jiraporn, 2010; Bebchuk et al., 2009, 2011; Chen et al., 2013; Khanna et al., 2015; Vo and 
Canil, 2019). Since PMC serves as an external disciplining mechanism and improves the 
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efficiency of firms (Giroud and Mueller, 2010, 2011; Chhaochharia et al., 2017), stronger PMC 
should reduce CEO power. However, the ability to respond fast to market conditions is 
considered a competitive advantage for firms and granting CEOs more power can reduce the 
implementation time for corporate decision making (Cuñat and Guadalupe, 2005; Li et al., 
2019). As such, powerful CEOs can benefit firms, especially in the presence of heightened 
competition in the product market.  
Furthermore, the effect of PMC on CEO power may crucially depend on the internal 
governance of firms. Adams et al. (2005) argue that powerful CEOs can sometimes display very 
poor performance, and yet in other cases excellent performance, depending on corporate 
governance and the firm’s corporate information environments. Chhaochharia and Grinstein 
(2007) and Bebchuk et al. (2009) contend that in the absence of corporate governance, agency 
problems are more likely to arise and adversely affect firm value. Moreover, Allen and Gale 
(2000), Giroud and Mueller (2010, 2011), and Chhaochharia et al. (2017) show that corporate 
governance regulations have a greater impact in firms with less competitive product markets.  
The above research leads me to posit that a significant moderating force in the 
relationship between PMC and CEO power is when the firm is more prone to agency problems. 
In particular, given that CEO power can potentially inflate agency issues, one reaction to 
increased PMC is for the firm to reduce CEO power when the firm’s internal corporate 
governance structure is weak. The reason being that with increased competition, there is a 
greater motivation for the firm to resolve agency issues in order to remain competitive in the 
new environment. Conversely, if firms already have good corporate governance, then there is 
less need to worry about the CEO using their power for private benefits. Indeed, in the presence 
of good corporate governance there can be an advantage in providing CEO’s with power as 
additional CEO power will allow for firm management to respond more quickly to uncertainty 
and profitability changes triggered by PMC (Cuñat and Guadalupe, 2005; Gaspar and Massa, 
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2006; Li et al., 2019). Therefore, given the above arguments, I postulate additional hypotheses 
around the notion that the impact of PMC on CEO power will be more pronounced where firms 
are more likely to be exposed to agency problems, such as in the case where they have weak 
internal corporate governance.  
To test the above hypotheses, I utilize the data of firms in the manufacturing sector (SIC 
200–399) from the S&P 1500 for the period of 1992 – 2016. I follow Adams et al. (2005) and 
focus on managerial structural power. This captures the aspect of the dominance of the CEO 
over the other executives.5 Specifically, I use the relative compensation of the CEO to that of 
the other top executives within a firm, i.e., the CEO pay slice (CPS) and CEO pay gap, to capture 
CEO power. These proxies are arguably more objective and capture more information of CEO 
power than other proxies utilized in the literature (Liu and Jiraporn, 2010; Bebchuk et al., 2011; 
Chen et al., 2013; Jiraporn, Liu & Kim, 2014; Vo and Canil, 2019). The argument for using this 
measure is that a higher relative compensation that the CEO has to the other executives is a 
signal that the CEO will likely be less dependent on the other executives to determine and 
execute decisions, implying higher CEO power. While it can also be argued to capture efficient 
contracting (Bugeja, Matolcsy & Spiropoulos, 2017), it has been used in the literature to 
examine the impact of CEO power on dividends and stock repurchases (Chintrakarn, 
Chatjuthamard & Jiraporn, 2018), capital structure (Jiraporn, Chintrakarn & Liu, 2012), 
independent directors (Jiraporn, Jumreornvong, Jiraporn & Singh, 2016) and corporate social 
responsibility (Jiraporn and Chintrakarn, 2013). It has also been used as a measure to examine 
the impact that say on pay laws have on managerial pay gaps (Correa and Lel, 2016). 
                                                 
5 Finkelstein (1992) identifies four sources of CEO power: structural power, ownership power, expert power, and 
prestige power. Structural power is most commonly cited in the literature on organizations (e.g., Adams et al., 
2005; Liu and Jiraporn, 2010; Bebchuk et al., 2011). 
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I employ the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) – the concentration in the market – and 
the Lerner Index – the reverse of the price elasticity of demand – to capture the degree of PMC 
(Gaspar and Massa, 2006). The lower the HHI and Lerner Index is, the more intensified 
competition there will be in the product market.  
To deal with potential sample selection bias that can arise from the fact that firms in high 
PMC environments may have different characteristics relative to those firms in low PMC 
environments, I match my high and low HHI/Lerner Index cohort of firms by a number of firm 
characteristics. Using regression analysis, I examine the effect of PMC on CEO power and, 
consistent with the agency theory of CEO power and the disciplining role of PMC, I find a 
statistically and economically significant and negative relationship between the level of PMC 
and CEO power. For example, CPS increases by approximately 8% and 6% when comparing 
firms in a low PMC environment (measured by HHI and Lerner Index, respectively) to a high 
PMC environment. 
A methodological concern for my regression analysis is that it may suffer from omitted 
variable bias. It is possible that both the level of PMC and CEO power can be related to 
unobservable factors, leading to a spurious relation between them. Another concern is reverse 
causality. CEO power may influence PMC. For example, less powerful CEOs may be under 
pressure to act more aggressively, such as raising sales and excessively increase investment to 
improve firm performance, which can all lead to higher competition. To mitigate these potential 
endogeneity problems, I use two identification strategies to test the robustness of my baseline 
results.  
My first identification strategy is to employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach. 
Specifically, I use HHI and the Lerner Index of firms on their IPO dates as an instrument for 
firms’ HHI and Lerner Index, respectively, and then conduct a two-stage least squares regression 
analysis. HHI and the Lerner Index of firms on their IPO dates represent the level of PMC in 
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the earliest years, which could not have resulted from CEO power in the subsequent years and 
thus reduce the possibility of reverse causality.  
My second identification strategy is to utilize tariff reductions as a quasi-natural 
experiment and run a propensity-score-matching-difference-in-differences (PSM-DiD) 
regression. Specifically, I first perform a PSM analysis to control for the differences in firm 
attributes between my treatment and control firms. Treatment firms are those firms that 
experience a large import tariff cut. I then employ tariff reductions as an exogenous shock that 
shifts PMC for my treated firms.  I find my baseline results are robust to the instrumental 
variable estimation and the PSM-DiD analysis.  
To test the impact that firm agency problems have in moderating the relationship, I 
conduct sub-sample analyses. I focus on how management entrenchment, as captured through 
the E-index (Bebchuk et al., 2009), CEO ownership, and analyst coverage moderate the impact 
of PMC on CEO power. I also follow Garvey and Milbourn (2006) and compare instances where 
firms experience good or bad luck (i.e. windfall performance). I find that PMC only has a 
significant effect on CEO power for firms with poor corporate governance, with a weak 
information environment, and experiencing good luck. My findings support the notion that PMC 
works as a substitute for corporate governance in disciplining CEO power, where the firm is 
more likely to be exposed to agency problems.  
This study contributes to the literature on agency problems of powerful CEOs. Bebchuk 
and Fried (2004) and Morse et al. (2011) show that CEO power dampens the efficiency of 
managerial incentive schemes. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that powerful CEOs tend to 
engage in larger deals relative to the size of their own firms, and the market reactions to their 
acquisition announcements tend to be more negative. Liu and Jiraporn (2010) and Chen et al. 
(2013) find that firms with powerful CEOs have a higher cost of debt and equity, respectively. 
Bebchuck et al. (2011) document that firms with powerful CEOs are associated with lower 
47 
profitability and firm value. Khanna et al. (2015) show that CEO power arising from 
appointment decisions are more likely to be associated with fraud and interfere with the 
detection of fraud. Vo and Canil (2019) argue that powerful CEOs can influence the pay-setting 
process such that they can get larger compensation. My results complement these prior studies 
by highlighting that market power works as a substitute for corporate governance in disciplining 
CEO power prone to agency problems.  
This study also contributes to the literature on the effect that PMC has on managerial 
incentives and corporate governance. Among others, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) show that 
firms in more competitive industries place more weight on rival firm performance than their 
own firm performance when designing their executive compensation. Cuñat and Guadalupe 
(2005) find that a higher level of product market competition increases the pay-performance 
sensitivity of compensation schemes for CEOs. Chhaochharia et al. (2017) and Giroud and 
Mueller (2010) utilize exogenous shocks to corporate governance and find that corporate 
governance has a stronger positive impact on firm efficiency when the market is more 
concentrated. Li et al. (2019) find that in high demand product markets where firms are facing 
entry threats, investors react more favorably to the announcements of granting more power to 
CEOs. Dasgupta et al. (2018) document that the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and its 
sensitivity to performance increases with competition shocks induced by tariff cuts. Tang (2018) 
extends Giroud and Mueller (2010) by highlighting the role of performance correlations. I 
complement this prior literature by showing how CPS and CEO pay gap, the relative pay within 
a firm, is affected by PMC and how corporate governance moderates this relationship. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the theory and 
develops hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the data and summary statistics. Section 3.4 shows 
the regression results. Section 3.5 conducts robustness tests. Section 3.6 presents the subsample 
analysis and section 3.7 provides a conclusion. 
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3.2 Hypotheses Development 
In this section, I develop my hypotheses based on the agency theory of CEO power and 
the disciplining role of PMC. While CEO dominance is a crucial determinant of corporate 
decisions, powerful CEOs are prone to a variety of shareholder-management agency conflicts. 
These agency conflicts result in excessive corporate acquisition decisions (Grinstein and Hribar, 
2004), rigged executive compensation designs (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Morse et al., 2011; 
Vo and Canil, 2019), negative impacts to firm value and profits (Bebchuck et al., 2011), higher 
financing cost of capital for firms (Liu and Jiraporn, 2010; Chen et al., 2013), and greater 
likelihood of corporate fraud (Khanna et al., 2015). These indicate that CEO power is subject to 
a variety of agency costs and may thus lead to adverse consequences that, overall, adversely 
affect firm value. 
Tracing back to Smith (1776), it has long been argued that competition in the product 
market plays a disciplining role in moderating agency problems. Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) 
show that if the shocks affecting firms in an industry are common rather than firm-specific, the 
performance of competitors allows shareholders to make inferences about these shocks. An 
increase in competition generates additional information that can be used to reduce moral 
hazard. Hart (1983) also argues that product market competition reduces potential free cash flow 
and limits the amount of managerial slack if the shocks are industry-wide, but not if they are 
independent across firms. Nickell (1996) contends that firms’ productivity grows when more 
players compete in the market. Schmidt (1997) shows that PMC increases the probability of 
liquidation and thus incentivizes managers to work harder to survive. Raith (2003) argues that 
competition makes it easier to steal product demand from rivals and thus incentivizes managers 
to exert more effort. Intensified PMC also implies that firms operate in a risky environment 
(Hou and Robinson, 2006). Shareholders will therefore have stronger incentives to scrutinize 
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the decisions of the CEO, leading to lower CEO power. Also, Kim and Lu (2011) show that the 
relation between CEO ownership and firm valuation hinges critically on the degree of industry 
concentration. All these studies point to PMC being an external mechanism that can improve 
firms’ operating efficiency and mitigate agency problems inside firms. This leads me to my first 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3.1 CEO power declines with the level of product market competition.  
 
External governance plays a more significant role when internal governance is poor 
(Bruno and Claessens, 2010; Kim and Lu, 2011). As such, PMC can work as a substitute for 
corporate governance to mitigate agency problems. Giroud and Mueller (2010) report that after 
the enforcement of business combination laws, that weakens anti-takeover provisions, those 
firms in non-competitive industries tend to experience a decline in operating performance 
whereas those in more competitive industries do not.6  This shows there is an important 
association between PMC and corporate governance. Giroud and Mueller (2011) show that 
firms with weak governance have lower equity returns in non-competitive industries. 
Chhaochharia et al. (2017) also present evidence that firm operating performance improves after 
the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which implies stronger corporate 
governance, and this result is more pronounced when firms face less competition in the product 
market. Dasgupta et al. (2018) find that the probability of forced CEO turnover increases when 
PMC intensifies, and this effect is more pronounced for firms with poor governance. In line with 
these arguments, my second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3.2 The effect of PMC on CEO power is stronger for weakly-governed firms 
                                                 
6 Tang (2018) extends Giroud and Mueller (2010) by showing that PMC improves firm performance after the 
enforcement of business combination laws only when firm performance is highly correlated with the industry 
performance or when firms compete in Bertrand-style competition. 
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Other than corporate governance, a number of other factors can reduce agency issues. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that CEO ownership can reduce agency problems since it 
encourages the CEO to act in the interest of shareholders. Moreover, Mehran (1995) reports that 
firms use equity-based pay to monitor CEOs’ performance and balance the percentage of equity-
based pay to their CEOs with the percentage of equity holdings and that firms use less equity-
based pay when there is more monitoring from blockholders. Kim and Lu (2011) find that CEO 
ownership is positively correlated with firm performance and is a substitute for external 
governance (e.g. PMC). As such, firms with low CEO ownership may be more subject to agency 
problems. In line with these arguments, my third hypothesis is:   
Hypothesis 3.3 The effect of PMC on CEO power is stronger for firms with low CEO 
ownership. 
 
I also consider how the information environment, proxied by analyst coverage, 
moderates the relation between PMC and CEO power. Financial analysts can be considered as 
an external monitor of executives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) because they can reveal 
corporate fraud due to their ability to access corporate information (Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Dyck, Morse & Zingales, 2010). Yu (2008) documents that firms with more analysts following 
tend to manage their earnings less. Moreover, stocks with intensive analyst coverage are more 
informative (Hong, Lim & Stein, 2000), thereby reducing information asymmetry (Chang, 
Dasgupta & Hilary, 2006). As such, analyst coverage can strengthen corporate governance and 
reduce information asymmetry. This implies that firms with low analyst coverage are more 
prone to agency problems. Following these arguments, my fourth hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3.4 The effect of PMC on CEO power is more pronounced for firms with 
low analyst coverage. 
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Finally, I examine the moderating effect of luck on the relationship between PMC and 
CEO power. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find that CEOs are rewarded by luck, which is 
defined as changes in firm performance that is out of the CEO’s control, and that well-governed 
firms design managerial compensation more efficiently than weakly-governed firms. However, 
it is not clear if CEOs influence the payment setting and enjoy pay-for-luck since they may also 
suffer when firms experience bad luck. Garvey and Milbourn (2006) further investigate this 
issue and find that CEOs enjoy higher pay when firms experience good luck. This problem is 
also amplified when firms have weak governance. The evidence of Cheng and Indjejikian 
(2009) support this notion by showing that CEO pay increases when firms experience good luck, 
but incentives are not rewarded based on skills. This indicates that CEOs are more likely to 
attribute success to themselves and utilize their power for opportunistic gains when firms 
experience windfall performance. As PMC disciplines CEO power, I conjecture that it will also 
balance incentive payments by reducing the power that allows CEOs to benchmark their 
performance against criteria that fit their own interest when firms experience good luck.  
Hypothesis 3.5 The effect of PMC on CEO power is more pronounced when the firm 
experiences good luck.  
 
3.3 Data and summary statistics 
My sample comprises of the S&P 1500 firms in the manufacturing sector (SIC 200–399) 
for the period of 1992–2016. I obtain the number of vice presidents in firms and CEO 
characteristics, such as their compensation, whether they serve as both a CEO and as chairman 
of the board (i.e. CEO chair duality), CEO ownership, and tenure from ExecuComp. Firm’s 
financial and stock price data are from Compustat and CRSP. I use data from the Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS – formerly RiskMetrics) to construct the E-index, which I use to 
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proxy for the corporate governance of the firm. Analyst coverage data is obtained from I/B/E/S. 
I restrict my sample to only include observations where CEOs serve in their position for at least 
one fiscal year. My final sample consists of 1,329 unique firms and 14,591 firm-year 
observations.  
In line with Adams et al. (2005), I focus on managerial structural power, the power of 
the CEO over the top executive team. Specifically, following Liu and Jiraporn (2010), Bebchuk 
et al. (2011), Chen et al. (2013), Jiraporn et al. (2014), and Vo and Canil (2019), I proxy CEO 
power by the relative compensation of the CEO to the other top executives’ compensation in the 
firm, which can be captured by CEO pay slice (CPS). CPS is defined as the ratio of the CEO’s 
total compensation to the summation of the top five executives’ compensation. Total 
compensation is from item TDC1 in ExecuComp, which includes salary, bonus, other annual, 
restricted stock and stock option grants, long-term incentive payouts and all other total 
compensation. Bebchuk et al. (2011) clarify the advantages of using CPS in that it captures CEO 
power more objectively than, say, CEO chair duality, and that it inherently controls for firm-
specific characteristics that influence compensation.7 
I also consider an alternative measurement of relative compensation that being a dummy 
variable to capture the pay gap CEOs have relative to the top management team. CEO pay gap 
is defined as the difference between CEO total compensation and the median of total 
compensation of the top five executives (Vo and Canil, 2019). To complement my first measure, 
CPS, which is a continuous variable, I capture CEO pay gap as a dummy variable to split the 
sample of firms between those with a high and low pay gap. CEO pay gap is equal to one if the 
pay gap is greater than the industry median for any given year, and zero otherwise. I classify 
industries within the manufacturing sector based on their three-digit SIC.  
                                                 
7 Some studies use CEO chair duality as a proxy of CEO power (for example, for example, Adams et al., 2005; Li 
et al., 2019; Morse et al., 2011). I include CEO chair duality as a control variable in my analysis. 
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For my regression analysis, I capture the level of PMC, the independent variable of 
interest, using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) and the Lerner Index. The HHI measures 
industry concentration (Gaspar and Massa, 2006). The higher the industry concentration, the 
less competition in the product market. The HHI is computed as the sum of the squared market 
share of firms in each year and in each industry based on their three-digit SIC. The market share 
is calculated from the sales item in Compustat. My alternative measure of PMC, the Lerner 
Index, is a measure of the market power of a firm. Higher market power implies a lower price-
elasticity of demand and less competition in the product market. The Lerner Index is calculated 
by first dividing earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) by 
sales.  
I include both firm financial and corporate governance control variables that may relate 
to CEO power. Cash holdings and Leverage affect CEO entrenchment and risk-taking behavior 
(Berger, Ofek and Yermack, 1997; Liu and Mauer, 2011). In addition, along with the argument 
that the decision on these corporate policies may influence the risk of firms, Adams et al. (2005) 
show that powerful CEOs influence corporate performance variability. Hence, I include the 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns (Stock return SD), representing firm risk, as a 
control variable. I include Firm size as the logarithm of the book value of total assets. The return 
on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q are also included and are adjusted by the median of the three-
digit SIC code that they are in. These measures capture firm performance and firm value, 
respectively. CEO chair duality and CEO ownership are also associated with CEO power 
(Finkelstein, 1992). I thus capture CEO chair duality through a dummy variable that is equal to 
one if the CEO also serves as the chair of the company’s board, and otherwise zero. High CEO 
ownership is equal to one if the CEO holds 20% or more of the firm’s shares, and otherwise 
zero. CEO tenure is the number of years that the CEO serves in the position. Insider ownership 
is the fraction of shares owned by insiders, and the Number of VP is the number of vice 
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presidents the firm has, as reported by ExecuComp.  Definitions for all the variables are 
provided in Appendix B.  
To ensure I do not suffer from a sample selection bias, as firms from low PMC 
environments may be characteristically different to those from high PMC environments, I split 
my sample of firms into low and high HHI / Lerner Index cohorts (based on median values) and 
then propensity score match the two groups of firms on a pairwise basis based on Firm size, 
Leverage, ROA and the standard deviation of stock returns (Stock return SD). I set the calipher 
at 1%. Table 3.1 shows the results from this matching process, providing me with a base sample 
of 5,182 firm-year observations from 1,086 individual firms. The co-variates used in the 
matching process are all insignificantly different from zero with the exception of ROA for the 
HHI-split and the standard deviation of stock returns in the Lerner Index-split.   
 
Table 3.1  Descriptive statistics of the matched sample 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the key variables used in the matched sample of S&P 1500 firms in the 
manufacturing industry (SIC 200 – 399) between 1992 – 2016. Panels A and B present the descriptive statistics of 
variables used in the matching process using high/low HHI and Lerner Index, respectively. ***, ** and * indicate the 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 Low HHI firms  High HHI firms  Diff in 
mean 
Standard error 
(diff in mean test) Variable Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD  
HHI 0.077 0.068 0.031  0.304 0.235 0.187  -0.227*** 0.004 
Matched co-variates         
Firm size 7.487 7.279 1.631  7.447 7.315 1.491  0.040 0.043 
Leverage 0.189 0.179 0.154  0.190 0.182 0.144  -0.001 0.004 
ROA 0.005 0.000 0.084  0.001 0.000 0.061  0.005** 0.002 
Stock return SD 0.106 0.094 0.056  0.105 0.090 0.061  0.001 0.002 
           
Panel B 
 Low Lerner Index firms  High Lerner Index firms  Diff in 
mean 
Standard error 
(diff in mean test) Variable Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD  
Lerner Index 0.097 0.105 0.088  0.210 0.189 0.071  -0.113*** 0.002 
Matched co-variates         
Firm size 7.384 7.250 1.408  7.433 7.323 1.441  -0.049 0.040 
Leverage 0.194 0.188 0.144  0.200 0.191 0.167  -0.006 0.004 
ROA 0.005 0.000 0.045  0.005 0.000 0.045  0.000 0.001 
Stock return SD 0.109 0.097 0.059  0.106 0.091 0.060  0.004** 0.002 
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3.4 Empirical results 
Table 3.2 reports the multivariate regression results for the effect of PMC on CEO power 
based on the aforementioned matched sample. The level of PMC is proxied by two dummy 
variables, High HHI and High Lerner Index, which equals one if the firm is in the high HHI / 
Lerner Index cohort, and zero otherwise. Columns 1 and 2 are OLS panel regressions while 
columns 3 and 4 are logit panel regressions. Columns 1 and 2 shows that CPS is greater when 
the industry is more concentrated (i.e. High HHI) and when firms have more market power (i.e. 
High Lerner Index), significant at the 1% level, respectively. CPS increases by approximately 
8% and 6% from the mean when the HHI and Lerner Index shift from the low to the high cohort 
of firms, respectively.8 Columns 3 and 4 provide similar results, with the coefficients for High 
HHI and the High Lerner Index being positive and significant at the 5% levels.  
Overall, the results in Table 3.2 support Hypothesis 3.1 in that CEO power decreases 
with the level of PMC. This is consistent with the agency theory of CEO power and the 
disciplining role of PMC. CEOs of firms in a more competitive market seem to lose some of 
their power.   
 
                                                 
8 CPS of firms with high HHI (Lerner Index) is 0.0311 (0.0238) higher than firms with a low HHI (Lerner Index). 
The mean of CPS of firms with a low HHI (Lerner Index) is 0.378 (0.380). This implies a proportional change of 
8.23% (6.26%) in CPS when moving from the low to high sub-samples. 
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Table 3.2  Multivariate regression analysis with matched sample 
This table presents the multivariate regression results of PMC on CEO power from a matched sample of firms from high 
and low PMC environments. CEO power is proxied by CPS and CEO pay gap. The intensity of PMC is measured by 
HHI and the Lerner Index. The sample is matched between low and high HHI / Lerner Index associated firms. Columns 
1 and 2 are OLS panel regressions while columns 3 and 4 are logit panel regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered 
by the three-digit SIC industry codes, are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
  CPS  CEO pay gap 
Variable (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
           
High HHI 0.0311***   0.7404**  
 (0.0084)   (0.3774)  
      
High Lerner Index  0.0238***   0.5670** 
  (0.0076)   (2.5121) 
      
Cash holding -0.0093 0.0061  -1.2912** -0.6642 
 (0.0211) (0.0165)  (0.6524) (-1.2852) 
      
Firm size -0.0070* -0.0023  0.7893*** 0.7739*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0052)  (0.1103) (7.1195) 
      
Industry median CPS 0.8088*** 0.7394***    
 (0.0466) (0.0511)    
      
Industry median CEO pay gap    -0.0001** -0.0001 
    (0.0000) (-1.0570) 
      
Leverage -0.0130 -0.0337*  -0.1078 -0.5556 
 (0.0163) (0.0175)  (0.3797) (-1.5816) 
      
ROA 0.0710** 0.0226  2.8624*** 0.3444 
 (0.0314) (0.0210)  (0.7874) (0.5247) 
      
Stock return SD -0.0581 -0.0062  -2.7341*** 1.0846 
 (0.0400) (0.0283)  (1.0036) (1.2599) 
      
Tobin's Q 0.0048*** 0.0005  0.3015*** 0.2169*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0013)  (0.0678) (5.1096) 
      
CEO chair duality 0.0033 -0.0086  0.3857*** 0.2470* 
 (0.0057) (0.0060)  (0.1291) (1.7778) 
      
High CEO ownership -0.0084 0.0288  -0.4257 -0.1062 
 (0.0174) (0.0286)  (0.5041) (-0.1606) 
      
CEO tenure 0.0017 -0.0003  0.0292 -0.0077 
 (0.0011) (0.0010)  (0.0201) (-0.3384) 
      
CEO tenure2 -0.0001** -0.0000  -0.0012 -0.0001 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0007) (-0.1510) 
      
Insider ownership -0.2955*** -0.3851***  -4.4215* -4.8820* 
 (0.1057) (0.1236)  (2.4316) (-1.7258) 
      
Insider ownership2 0.4533*** 0.5368***  7.9811* 8.6651 
 (0.1697) (0.2044)  (4.7277) (1.4091) 
      
Number of VP 0.0056*** 0.0004  0.1799*** 0.2505*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0018)  (0.0485) (4.5634) 
      
Constant 0.1083*** 0.1301***    
 (0.0319) (0.0482)    
      
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2 / Pseudo-R2 0.183 0.103  0.071 0.065 




3.5 Robustness Tests 
In this section, I examine the robustness of my baseline results. I acknowledge that my 
multivariate regression analysis is subject to potential endogeneity problems. In particular, they 
may suffer from omitted variable bias. Although my firm fixed effect regressions alleviate, to 
an extent, the potential omitted variable bias, the relation between PMC and CEO power may 
be confounded by unobservable factors, leading to a spurious relation between them. Reverse 
causality may also be a problem. That is, CEO power may influence PMC. CEOs with less 
power may have greater pressure from shareholders to improve firm performance, leading them 
to implement more aggressive corporate policies, such as boosting sales or excessive 
investment. These firm decisions can, in turn, influence the policies of peer firms (Leary and 
Roberts, 2014) such that the product market becomes more competitive. This can lead to CEO 
power causing a change in the competition level of the product market. I alleviate these 
endogeneity concerns by first employing an instrumental variable (IV) approach and then by 
utilizing a quasi-natural experiment. 
 
3.5.1 Instrumental Variable Estimation  
My first identification strategy is to employ an instrumental variable approach. 
Specifically, I use HHI and the Lerner Index of firms on their IPO dates as an instrument for 
firms’ HHI and Lerner Index, respectively. HHI and the Lerner Index of firms on their IPO dates 
represent the level of PMC in the firm’s earliest years, which cannot have resulted from CEO 
power in the subsequent years and thereby reduces the possibility of reverse causality. I conduct 
the two-stage least squares regression analysis with my prior sample used in my baseline 
regressions. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.3 report the result of the first-stage regressions where 
the dependent variables are High HHI and High Lerner Index, respectively. The explanatory 
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variables include the above-mentioned instruments and the same control variables as in the 
baseline regression.  The coefficient estimates for the instruments in the first-stage regressions 
(1) and (2) are statistically significant at the 1% and 5 % levels, respectively, suggesting my 
instruments are valid. Columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Table 3.3 report the result of the second-stage 
regressions where the dependent variables are CPS and CEO pay gap, respectively. The 
variables of interest are the coefficients with the predicted values of High HHI and High Lerner 
Index. All the regression coefficients for High HHI / High Lerner Index are significant to at least 
the 5% level and are all positive. This is consistent with my main hypothesis (Hypothesis 3.1). 
**** 
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Table 3.3  Two-stage least squares 
This table presents results from a two stage least squares regression approach where the HHI and Lerner Index values during the 
IPO date of each firm is used as an instrumental variable. Firms having an age of less than 10 years are excluded. Columns 1 and 
2 are OLS panel regressions while columns 3 and 4 are logit panel regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by the three-digit 
SIC industry codes, are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  1st Stage  2nd Stage 
 High HHI High Lerner Index  CPS CEO pay gap 
Variable (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
               
High HHI    0.0187**  2.3793**  
    (0.0087)  (1.2005)  
        
High Lerner Index     0.0196**  0.8905*** 
     (0.0095)  (0.2337) 
        
IPO HHI 0.8996***       
 (0.3404)       
        
IPO Lerner Index  0.0008**      
  (0.0004)      
        
Cash holding -0.7120*** 0.1866***  -0.1250* -0.0045 -12.3404** -0.2157 
 (0.2459) (0.0520)  (0.0650) (0.0194) (6.1735) (0.4352) 
        
Firm size -0.0289 0.0388***  -0.0129** -0.0069*** 0.4028* 0.8036*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0040)  (0.0054) (0.0015) (0.2333) (0.0420) 
        
Industry median CPS -0.0532 -0.1409  0.8361*** 0.7799***   
 (0.2443) (0.1673)  (0.0435) (0.0470)   
        
Industry median CEO pay gap 0.0001** 0.0001***    -0.0001* -0.0004*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)    (0.0000) (0.0000) 
        
Leverage 0.3623** -0.1392***  0.0298 -0.0161 6.7225* -0.0906 
 (0.1438) (0.0339)  (0.0415) (0.0125) (3.6867) (0.2845) 
        
ROA 0.1262 2.1276***  0.0672 0.1250*** 4.4964*** -1.4742** 
 (0.1482) (0.0535)  (0.0457) (0.0295) (1.1457) (0.7019) 
        
Stock return SD -0.7149** -0.3832***  -0.1630* -0.0153 -11.4930** 2.1928*** 
 (0.3140) (0.0953)  (0.0866) (0.0367) (5.2823) (0.8312) 
        
Tobin’s Q -0.0129 0.0338***  0.0044 -0.0019 0.0818 0.2174*** 
 (0.0242) (0.0041)  (0.0034) (0.0016) (0.1120) (0.0418) 
        
CEO chair duality 0.0210 0.0223*  0.0019 0.0114** 0.7593*** 0.2981*** 
 (0.0410) (0.0119)  (0.0074) (0.0045) (0.2590) (0.1016) 
        
High CEO ownership 0.0408 0.0044  -0.0132 0.0460** 2.6251** 0.3568 
 (0.0730) (0.0511)  (0.0201) (0.0193) (1.2901) (0.4320) 
        
CEO tenure -0.0016 0.0009  0.0028** 0.0010 -0.0726** 0.0126 
 (0.0035) (0.0020)  (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0345) (0.0175) 
        
CEO tenure2 -0.0001 0.0000  -0.0002*** -0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0006) 
        
Insider ownership 1.2959*** 0.7266***  0.0512 -0.2770*** 25.9898** -9.7013*** 
 (0.4281) (0.2211)  (0.0688) (0.0811) (11.5478) (1.8922) 
        
Insider ownership2 -2.1874** -1.5356***  -3.9502*** 0.0263 -50.5498** 19.8598*** 
 (0.8763) (0.4725)  (1.2680) (0.1775) (23.7435) (4.0049) 
        
Number of VP -0.0067 -0.0037  0.0047** 0.0097*** -0.1459 0.0196 
 (0.0104) (0.0043)  (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0998) (0.0385) 
        
Constant    0.3255*** 0.1321***   
    (0.1049) (0.0237)   
        
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 / Pseudo-R2 0.279 0.569  0.282 0.156 0.047 0.085 
Observations 3,518 3,074  3,518 3,074 3,055 2,858 
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3.5.2. A Quasi-Natural Experiment 
My second identification strategy is to utilize large U.S. import tariff reductions as a 
quasi-natural experiment. The logic behind this is that as trade barriers are lowered after large 
import tariff reductions, PMC will intensify from increased foreign competition. Hence, the 
import tariff reductions exogenously shift the competitive environment in the related industries 
(Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006; Fresard, 2010). Importantly, given that tariff reductions are 
mainly driven by global economics and politics, as well as being regulated under trade 
agreements (Huang et al., 2017), these tariff reductions are exogenous to the individual CEO’s 
power.  
I employ the propensity-score-matching-difference-in-differences (PSM-DiD) approach 
to analyze the impact of tariff reductions. Specifically, I follow Huang et al. (2017) in identifying 
the large import tariff reductions I use in my analysis. They must be three times the median of 
the tariff rate reductions that took place during my sample period. The tariff rate is computed at 
the three-digit SIC as the ratio of duties collected by U.S. Customs to the free-on-board value 
of imports. The U.S. import tariff rate data is compiled by Schott (2010) and Peter Schott’s 
website.9 The list of 53 industries affected by large tariff reductions is presented in Appendix 
D. I use propensity scores to match control firms, who have not experienced a tariff cut in their 
three-digit SIC industry, with treated firms, whose three-digit SIC industry does experience a 
tariff cut, to ensure I am comparing like-for-like firms. Control and treatment firms are matched 
for the same period and with a caliper of 1%. To ensure I have a sufficient sample of matched 
firms, I base the propensity scores on the three-year averages of five key co-variates prior to 
each tariff cut. These are the four co-variates used for matching in the baseline results (Firm 
size, ROA, Stock return SD and Leverage) plus my CEO power measures (CPS and CEO pay 
                                                 
9 http://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/sub_international.htm 
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gap). The effect of the large tariff reductions on CEO power is then analyzed using Equation 
3.1, which is similar to Flammer (2015): 
Δ𝐶𝑃𝑆/𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑝𝑎𝑦 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐶𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝐗𝐢,𝐭 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , (3.1) 
where Δ𝐶𝑃𝑆 (Δ𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑝𝑎𝑦 𝑔𝑎𝑝) is the differences in firms’ average CPS (CEO pay gap) in the 
three years after large tariff reductions minus that of the three-year average before the large tariff 
reductions. 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐶𝑢𝑡 is a dummy variable that is equal to one for treated firms and zero 
otherwise. 𝐗 is a vector of control variables, 𝜃𝑖 and 𝜃𝑡 are firm and year fixed effects, 
respectively. The control variables are identical to those used previously with the addition of 
including the lagged dependent variable, as suggested by Flammer (2015), to control for the 
level of CPS/CEO pay gap between the treated and control firms before the tariff cut occurs. 
Panels A and B of Table 3.4 report the descriptive statistics of the five covariates used 
to match treatment and control firms used in the DiD regression for CPS and CEO pay gap, 
respectively. The matching process was successful, with only ROA being different across the 
two groups in Panel A. There is, however, a cost in using large tariff cuts as an exogenous event 
in that only 299 firms experience it during my sample period (see Appendix D for details). In 
addition, I lose a few more firms due to matching process thresholds not being met (with the 
calipher set at 1%). The end result is that I have fewer than 600 firm observations when 
combining the treatment and control groups. 
Column 1 of Table 3.5 reports the result of the DiD regression of the matched sample 
between changes in CPS and Tariff Cut. The coefficient of the Tariff Cut is -0.0238 and 
significant at the 1% level. This implies that three years following a tariff reduction, CPS of the 
treated firms decreases by 0.0238. It is worth noting that this result differs from Dasgupta et al. 
(2018), where they find that CEO pay gap increases after a tariff cut. However, they only 
consider firms whose CEOs are not sacked after tariff cuts, so their observations are more likely 
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to be restricted to high-ability CEOs.10  Given that Panel A of Table 3.4 reveals that CPS for the 
treated firms is 0.3399 preceding the tariff reductions, I can infer that following the tariff cuts, 
CPS of the treated firms reduces by 7% relative to the average CPS preceding the large tariff 
reductions. Column 2 of Table 3.5 shows the relationship also holds when the dummy variable 
CEO pay gap is used, although it is now only significant at the 10% level. Taken together, the 
results from the PSM-DiD analysis corroborate Hypothesis 3.1 that PMC reduces CEO power. 
 
Table 3.4  Exogenous shock: Descriptive statistics 
This table utilizes import tariff reductions as exogenous shocks. Treated firms are firms affected by tariff cuts. 
Control firms are firms that are not affected by tariff cuts. Panels A and B show the descriptive statistics of the 
three-year averages of variables used in the propensity matching process. Robust standard errors, clustered by 
three-digit SIC, are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A       
 Treated firms  Control firms  Diff in 
mean 
Standard error  
(diff in mean test) Variable Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD  
           
CPS 0.3399 0.3390 0.0965  0.3464 0.3362 0.0968  -0.0065 0.0081 
Firm Size 6.8929 6.7825 1.6616  6.7789 6.5549 1.4671  0.114 0.1308 
Leverage 0.1754 0.1528 0.1390  0.1714 0.1506 0.1449  0.004 0.0119 
ROA -0.0163 -0.0014 0.1084  0.0059 0.0000 0.0813  -0.0222*** 0.0080 
Stock return SD 0.0968 0.0820 0.0462  0.0991 0.0854 0.0485  -0.0023 0.0040 
                      
Panel B       
 Treated firms  Control firms  Diff in 
mean 
Standard error  
(diff in mean test) Variable Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD  
           
CEO pay gap 0.5556 0.6667 0.4252  0.5501 0.5000 0.4256  0.0055 0.0364 
Firm Size 6.9220 6.7995 1.6573  6.9229 6.8049 1.4523  -0.0009 0.1334 
Leverage 0.1758 0.1528 0.1382  0.1703 0.1636 0.1306  0.0008 0.0039 
ROA -0.0117 -0.0013 0.1035  -0.0009 -0.0016 0.0768  -0.0108 0.0078 
Stock return SD 0.0972 0.0822 0.0469  0.0964 0.0835 0.0430  0.0055 0.0115 
                      
 
 
                                                 
10 There are also differences in the sample used. Dasgupta et al. (2018) use a shorter sample period stretching from 
1993-2005 and focus on S&P 1500 firms, whereas I focus on the period 1993-2016 and manufacturing sector firms.  
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Table 3.5  Exogenous shock: Propensity score matched difference-in-difference (PSM-DiD) regressions 
This table presents results of propensity score matched difference-in-difference (PSM-DiD) regressions. I utilize import 
tariff reductions as exogenous shocks. Column (1) is the regression of the difference between 3-year average CPS 
following and preceding the tariff reductions of the matched sample. Column (2) reports the regression results when 
using the change in the CEO pay gap. Robust standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC, are in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 ΔCPS   ΔCEO pay gap  
Variable (1)  (2) 
       
Tariff Cut -0.0238***  -0.0503* 
 (0.0089)  (0.0280) 
    
Lag dependent variable -1.0919***  -1.0359*** 
 (0.0954)  (0.0570) 
    
Lag control variables    
Cash holding -0.0504  -0.2704 
 (0.1052)  (0.7459) 
    
Firm size -0.0423**  0.0275 
 (0.0188)  (0.0733) 
    
Leverage 0.1053  0.5223 
 (0.1042)  (0.3197) 
    
ROA -0.0635  -0.7372 
 (0.1284)  (0.5694) 
    
Stock return SD 0.5218***  0.2650 
 (0.1590)  (1.0363) 
    
Tobin’s Q -0.0001  0.0508* 
 (0.0099)  (0.0268) 
    
CEO chair duality  -0.0137  0.1417*** 
 (0.0178)  (0.0465) 
    
High CEO ownership 0.0149  -1.5674*** 
 (0.0203)  (0.4993) 
    
CEO tenure -0.0023  0.0095 
 (0.0042)  (0.0146) 
    
CEO tenure2 0.0000  0.0000 
 (0.0002)  (0.0005) 
    
Insider ownership -0.1626  -5.2580 
 (0.5681)  (3.7892) 
    
Insider ownership2 0.5701  21.7199** 
 (1.1335)  (9.5539) 
    
Number of VP -0.0093  -0.0003 
 (0.0100)  (0.0462) 
    
Constant 0.7516***  0.2430 
 (0.1468)  (0.6441) 
    
Firm FE Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.641  0.7443 
Observations 574  546 
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3.5.3 Alternative proxies of CEO power 
Apart from compensation, Finkelstein (1992) and Adams et al. (2005) use the number 
of formal titles and positions the CEO has as an indicator of CEO power over the board of 
directors. I calculate Title distance to be the difference between the number of titles of a CEO 
and that of the average number of titles held by other directors and No. of committees CEO 
serves on to be the number of committees of the firm that the CEO is a member of. This includes 
the audit committee, compensation committee, nominating committee and corporate 
governance committee. This data is retrieved from ISS. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.6 present the results using Title distance as a dependent 
variable from the matched sample of firms with High HHI and High Lerner Index being 
significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. This indicates that firms operating within a 
high product market competition environment will hold fewer titles when compared to other 
board members. 
In Columns 3 and 4, I show the results from using No. of committees CEO serves on. 
Results show that the coefficients for High HHI and High Lerner Index are significant at the 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. This reveals that CEOs of firms experiencing more intensified 
product market competition serve on a fewer number of committees. Overall, these results 
support Hypothesis 3.1 and show that my results are robust. 
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Table 3.6  Alternative proxies of CEO power 
Alternative proxies of CEO power used here are title distance and number of committees that CEOs serve on. Title 
distance is measured by the difference between a number of title that a CEO has and the mean of a number of title 
of other directors. No. of committees CEO serving on is the number of committees that CEOs are members, 
including audit committee, compensation committee, nominating committee and corporate governance committee. 
Then, I match the sample between low and high HHI and Lerner Index, which is defined by the top and bottom 
terciles, respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 Title distance  No. of committees CEO serves on  
Variable (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
           
High HHI 0.3665***   0.1365**  
 (0.0427)   (0.0531)  
      
High Lerner Index  0.1092**   0.0428* 
  (0.0545)   (0.0244) 
      
Control variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.358 0.366  0.115 0.099 
Observations 3,224 3,026  3,224 3,026 
 
3.6 Subsample analysis 
In this section, I further investigate the relationship between PMC and CEO power 
through sub-sample analysis, with a particular emphasis in discovering how the relationship is 
moderated in the presence of potential agency problems that affect firms. Specifically, I examine 
the impact that firm management entrenchment (i.e. the E-index), CEO ownership, Analyst 
coverage, and Luck have on the relationship in order to test Hypotheses 3.2 – 3.5. I focus on 
using my baseline regression models to investigate this as I do not have sufficient observations 
to allow for sub-sample splits using my exogenous shock tariff cut test. 
 
3.6.1 Management entrenchment 
Prior literature reveals that PMC can be a moderator of the relationship between 
corporate governance and a firm’s operating performance (Giroud and Mueller, 2010; 
Chhaochharia et al., 2017) as well as firm value (Giroud and Mueller, 2011). To examine its 
role as a moderator of CEO power and test Hypothesis 3.2, I split my sample of matched firms 
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between those that have weak and strong corporate governance, based on their E-index scores 
from Bebchuk et al. (2009). The E-index consists of six provisions that can be categorized into 
two dimensions – those that limit shareholders’ voting power and those that serve as anti-
takeover provisions.11 The E-index score is from 0-6 based on the number of provisions the firm 
has. The higher the E-index score, the more entrenched management is, leading to weaker 
corporate governance.  
I split my firms based on this score following the same schema used by Harford, 
Humphery-Jenner and Powell (2012) where I classify firms as having a strong governance 
environment if the E-index score is two or less, and categorize firms as having weak corporate 
governance if the score is greater than two. Table 3.7 presents the subsample regression of CEO 
power on PMC in firms with weak and strong governance, respectively. I use the same set-up 
as my earlier baseline regression results shown in Table 3.2.12  Columns 1 and 2 report the 
results of the subsample regressions of CPS on the HHI of firms with a low and a high E-index 
score, respectively. The results show that High HHI positively affects CPS, with 10% 
significance, only in firms with a high E-index score. Columns 3 and 4 report the results of 
subsample regressions of CPS on the Lerner Index of firms. The coefficient of the High Lerner 
Index on CPS is positive and significant at the 5% level only in firms with a high E-index. CEO 
pay gap is employed as an alternative proxy of CEO power in the analysis shown in Columns 5 
– 8. A similar result is obtained for High HHI, showing that it is only significant, at the 5% 
level, when the E-index score is high. However, I find no significance for a relationship when 
examining the Lerner Index in Columns 7 and 8.  
                                                 
11 These six provisions include classified boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority voting 
requirements for charters, by-laws and mergers. 
12 I am unable to run analyses using the exogenous shock test (i.e. Table 3.5) due to a lack of observations when 
sub-sampling. 
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Overall, with the exception of the Lerner Index with CEO pay gap, the results display a 
consistent pattern showing that PMC does affect CEO power only in firms that have weaker 
corporate governance, confirming Hypothesis 3.2. My results complement the literature that 
shows PMC is a substitute for corporate governance in mitigating agency problems (Giroud and 
Mueller, 2010, 2011; Kim and Lu, 2011; Chhaochharia et al., 2017). 
 
Table 3.7  Management entrenchment subsample analysis 
This table presents the subsample regression results where firms are split into two groups based on their E-index score. I 
classify firms with a score of two or less as Low, and three or more as High. Then, I match the sample between low and 
high HHI and Lerner Index, which is defined by the top and bottom terciles, respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered 
by three-digit SIC codes, are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  CPS  CEO pay gap 
 E-index  E-index 
 Low High Low High  Low High Low High 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
 
        
High HHI -0.0083 0.0126*    1.2545 2.0527**   
 (0.0096) (0.0075) 
   (2.0409) (0.9835)   
High Lerner Index   0.0006 0.0226**  
  0.2519 0.1203 
   (0.0181) (0.0110)  
  (0.6207) (0.2678) 
     
 
    
Control variable Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 / Pseudo-R2 0.142 0.167 0.115 0.111  0.102 0.097 0.141 0.065 
Observations 1,562 3,384 1,054 3,410  464 1,400 462 1,932 
     
 
    
 
3.6.2 CEO ownership 
Some studies consider CEO ownership as a tool to mitigate agency problems (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Kim and Lu, 2011). Considering that CEO power is associated with agency 
problems, CEO ownership can control CEOs not to exercise their power to extract rent. This 
motivates me to investigate how PMC affects CEO power when firms have either low or high 
CEO ownership. If CEO ownership is less than 10% I classify it as Low CEO ownership. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.8 show the regression results from this subsample analyses. While 
no significant relationship is evident between CPS and HHI firms, there is between the High 
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Lerner Index and Low CEO ownership. The coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% 
level (Column 3). A similar result is obtained when I use CEO pay gap. The coefficients for 
both High HHI and High Lerner Index are positive and significant (at the 1% and 10% levels in 
columns (5) and (7), respectively) when there is low CEO ownership.  
The results in Table 3.8 provide support for Hypothesis 3.3 that the effect of PMC on 
CEO power is more pronounced for firms whose CEOs have low share ownership. This 
complements Kim and Lu (2011), which shows that CEO ownership works effectively to 
mitigate agency problems when external governance is weak. 
 
Table 3.8  CEO ownership subsample analysis 
This table presents the subsample regression analysis by CEO ownership. High (Low) CEO Ownership is where the CEO 
owns at least (less than) 10% of the total number of shares of the firm. Then, I match the sample between low and high 
HHI and Lerner Index, which is defined by the top and bottom terciles, respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered by 
three-digit SIC codes, are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  CPS  CEO pay gap 
 CEO ownership  CEO ownership 
 Low High Low High  Low High Low High 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
     
 
    
High HHI 0.0022 0.0094    1.7364*** 0.7525   
 (0.0052) (0.0174)    (0.6336) (0.5850)   
High Lerner Index   0.0200** 0.0712    0.4431* -0.2400 
   (0.0095) (0.0766)    (0.2325) (0.6718) 
     
 
    
Control variable Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 / Pseudo-R2 0.165 0.416 0.099 0.462  0.086 0.225 0.063 0.163 
Observations 3,728 350 4,418 172  2,030 150 2,750 148 
     
 
    
 
3.6.3 Analyst following 
The extant literature considers that the number of analysts following a firm captures the 
degree of external monitoring there is of executives and leads to greater stock informativeness 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Hong et al., 2000; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Chang et al., 2006; 
Yu, 2008; Dyck et al., 2010). As such, I expect this will influence the effect of PMC on CEO 
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power. I test Hypothesis 3.4 by splitting my sample between firms with high and low Analyst 
coverage. I define firms with a low (high) level of analyst coverage based on whether the 
number of analysts following a firm is smaller (greater) than the median number of analysts in 
the same three-digit SIC industry, measured on an annual basis. Table 3.9 reports the regression 
results. Providing support for Hypothesis 3.4, I find a statistically significant relationship 
between CEO power and PMC is only present when there is low Analyst coverage. Specifically, 
in columns (1), (5) and (7) for High HHI with CPS and High HHI / Higher Lerner Index with 
CEO pay gap, respectively.  
 
Table 3.9  Analyst following subsample analysis 
This table presents the subsample regression analysis where firms are split between having either a high, or low, number 
of analyst coverage. High (Low) Analyst coverage is where the number of analysts is greater (smaller) than the median of 
the number of analysts that cover firms in the same three-digit SIC as the focus firm for that year. Then, I match the sample 
between low and high HHI and Lerner Index, which is defined by the top and bottom terciles, respectively. Robust standard 
errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
  CPS  CEO pay gap 
 Analyst following  Analyst followings 
 Low High Low High  Low High Low High 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
     
 
    
High HHI 0.1254** -0.0075    0.7638** 0.0040   
 (0.0604) (0.0301) 
   (0.3399) (0.4015)   
High Lerner Index   -0.0020 0.0131  
  1.1960** -0.5573 
   (0.0194) (0.0161)  
  (0.4930) (0.5888) 
     
 
    
Control variable Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 / Pseudo-R2 0.156 0.117 0.113 0.105  0.095 0.096 0.139 0.211 
Observations 1,192 1,088 1,444 1,242  1,122 1,090 740 618 
     
 
    
 
3.6.4 Luck 
Finally, I test Hypothesis 3.5 by following Garvey and Milbourn (2006) and Cheng and 
Indjejikian (2009) in defining firms experiencing good luck and bad luck in each period. Luck 
is the performance component that CEOs cannot control. Luck is measured as the predicted 
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value of the stock return from the regression of stock returns on the value-weighted market 
return, 3-digit SIC industry average return, industry and year fixed effects. I define firms 
experiencing good (bad) Luck in each year if Luck is positive (negative) in that period. Columns 
1 and 3 of Table 3.10 report that HHI and the Lerner Index increase CPS, with 5% significance, 
only when luck is good. Likewise, columns 5 and 7 show that HHI and the Lerner Index are 
positively related to CEO pay gap at the 10% and 1% significance, respectively, when Luck is 
positive. My findings support Hypothesis 3.5 that the effect of PMC on CEO power is more 
pronounced when the firm experiences good luck. Garvey and Milbourn (2006) and Cheng and 
Indjejikian (2009) argue that good luck is related to agency problems and unbalanced payments, 
and my results indicate that PMC mitigates this issue.  
  
Table 3.10  Luck subsample analysis 
This table presents subsample regression analysis based on splitting firms, on an annual basis, on whether they experience 
a windfall profit (good luck) or loss (bad luck). Luck is estimated as the predicted stock return from a regression of stock 
returns on the value-weighted market return, 3-digit SIC industry average return, and industry and year fixed effects. . 
Then, I match the sample between low and high HHI and Lerner Index, which is defined by the top and bottom terciles, 
respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  CPS  CEO pay gap 
 Luck  Luck 
 Good Bad Good Bad  Good Bad Good Bad 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
     
 
    
High HHI -0.0008 -0.0119    1.7421** -0.2067   
 (0.0093) (0.0166)    (0.7325) (0.2280)   
High Lerner Index   0.0180* 0.0222    0.5525** 0.9416 
   (0.0092) (0.0305)    (0.2704) (1.3335) 
     
 
    
Control variable Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 / Pseudo-R2 0.163 0.349 0.101 0.162  0.076 0.254 0.080 0.333 
Observations 3,654 896 3,630 906  1,646 148 1,984 174 
     
 




My study investigates the effect of product market competition on CEO power. I find 
robust evidence that CEOs have less power when the product market is more competitive. 
Further analysis reveals that the effect of PMC on CEO power is more pronounced for firms 
with greater management entrenchment, lower CEO ownership, less analysts following and 
when firms experience windfall positive performance. Taken together, my results suggest that 
PMC works as a substitute for corporate governance, ‘reigning in’ CEO power in firms that are 
more likely prone to agency problems.   
My findings provide policy implications. In particular, my results indicate that corporate 
insiders, including shareholders and boards of directors, should monitor CEOs more 
meticulously when firms operate in a less competitive market to ensure that they are less likely 
to utilize their power for private benefit. For policymakers, my results show that there are 
limitations to how much corporate governance, on its own, can resolve agency problems relating 
to controlling CEO power, highlighting the need to take the market structure into account, as 





Chapter 4: The effect of product market competition and 
corporate complexity on firm performance 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this study, the effect of corporate complexity on firm performance under intensified 
product market competition is examined. Prior literature has reported mixed evidence on how 
the complexity of a firm, mainly proxied by business diversification, can impact its 
performance. For example, Damanpour (1996), Hovakimian (2011), and Kuppuswamy and 
Villalonga (2015) find that complexity improves innovation and the efficiency of capital 
allocation. Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2015) show that complexity provides value added to 
firms during a financial crisis. In contrast, Berry et al. (2006), Seru (2014), and Skrastins and 
Vig (2019) document that more complex firms have less effective monitoring of CEOs, less 
innovation, and poorer loan performance. These variations indicate that the effect of complexity 
on firm performance is contingent on the circumstances under which firms are operating. In this 
study, focus will be placed analysis on a natural challenge of every firm, the situation where 
product market competition is intensified.  
The literature on firm complexity uses different proxies of complexity, such as business 
diversification (Berry et al., 2006; Hovakimian, 2011; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2015) and 
organizational hierarchy and size (Damanpour, 1996; Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010; Skrastins and 
Vig, 2019), both of which focus on complexity within an individual firm. Other studies 
investigate complexity across firms, such as ownership structure (La Porta et al., 1999; Yang 
and Schwarz, 2016) and the network in a business group (Altomonte and Rungi, 2013). This 
research departs from these prior studies by investigating complexity from the perspective of 
the business holding portfolio structure of firms. I consider the number of subsidiaries, the 
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number of subsidiaries weighted by percentage of firm ownership, the number of chains in a 
business holding portfolio, and the number of levels in a business holding portfolio hierarchy. 
These measures can be called corporate complexity, which provides information regarding both 
the span and depth of a firm’s ownership of other firms in its business holding portfolio.13  
The hypotheses are developed as follows. On the one hand, it is known that firms are 
more likely to have lower profitability when they face more intense competition in the product 
market because they lose their market power (Lerner, 1934; Elzinga and Mills, 2011; Xu, 2012). 
Thus, firms operating in more intense product market competition must improve their efficiency 
in resource allocation, communication, and knowledge transference in order to promote a 
competitive advantage and in order to survive (Lengnick-Hall, 1992; Guadalupe and Wulf, 
2010). Complex firms have the advantage of adopting innovation (Damanpour, 1996) and 
improving the efficiency of their capital allocation (Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2015). Under 
this hypothesis, corporate complexity would yield a competitive advantage by buffering the 
negative effect of product market competition on firm performance. On the other hand, Vijh 
(2006) argues that complex may impede the capital allocation efficiency of firms. Seru (2014) 
shows that firms produce less innovation due to the “new-toy effect” once they become more 
complex. Under this alternative hypothesis, more complex firms will experience a greater 
decrease in their performance when they operate in a more competitive product market. 
To test which hypothesis dominates, novel data on corporate complexity are used, which 
consist of the number of subsidiaries and the depth and span of the business holding portfolios 
of U.S. publicly-listed firms in the period of 2012-2016. A propensity-score-matching-
difference-in-differences approach (PSM-DiD) is employed, and import tariff reductions as 
                                                 
13 I focus on the number of subsidiaries not the number of branches. The reason is that firms have full control power 
over their branches but their control powers over their subsidiaries depend on the percentage of ownership in the 
subsidiaries, which makes it more difficult to become involved in the strategic decisions of the subsidiaries. 
Moreover, subsidiaries may operate in different businesses, unlike branches. Therefore, the number of subsidiaries 
is more relevant to corporate complexity than the number of branches. 
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exogenous shocks to product market competition, in order to mitigate potential endogeneity 
problems, including omitted variable bias and reversed causality. It is found that in sharp 
contrast with firms with more business diversification experiencing a greater increase in firm 
performance, firms with higher corporate complexity experience a greater decrease in firm 
performance. In particular, these firms suffer a drop of approximately 1% to 9% from the mean 
of Tobin’s Q when facing large import tariff reductions. Moreover, the subsampling analysis 
shows that the interacting effect of corporate complexity and product market competition on 
firm performance is more pronounced for firms with high levels of financial constraints, opacity, 
and capital expenditure (CAPEX). These results indicate that while intensified product market 
competition implies less profitability and stronger need for capital, firms with higher corporate 
complexity are associated with inefficiency in resource allocation because these firms have 
more ownership commitments to other firms such that they face inflexibility of funds. Firm 
performance is even worse for firms with less financial accessibility, such as firms with financial 
constraints, opaqueness, and high investment.  
This research contributes to the literature that examines the effect of corporate 
complexity on firm performance. Prior literature provides varied results depending on how 
corporate complexity reacts to external changes. Here the upward shift in product market 
competition is investigated, which is a natural threat of every firm. Under higher pressure of 
product market competition, corporate complexity diminishes firm performance. The present 
findings differ from the evidence of Hovakimian (2011) and Kuppuswamy and Villalonga 
(2015), which focuses on the influence of complexity under a financial crisis and uses business 
diversification as a proxy of complexity. A novel and distinct dimension of complexity is 
considered by taking into account of ownership structure, including the number of subsidiaries 
and the span and depth of the business holding portfolio structure. The proxy of complexity 
exhibits a distinct role because it is found that while business diversification enhances firm 
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performance, corporate complexity diminishes firm performance when product market 
competition becomes more intense.  
This study also sheds light on how corporate complexity influences firm performance. 
The results report that the significant and negative effect of corporate complexity on firm 
performance under the pressure from product market competition is more pronounced for firms 
with a high demand for capital but that have difficulty in raising it, which implies that 
inflexibility and inefficiency of capital allocation explain why corporate complexity adversely 
impacts firm performance. These findings are in contrast with the results of Slovin and Sushka 
(1997), which evaluate the ownership in a parent-subsidiary structure as a proxy of complexity. 
They report that complexity improves financial flexibility. However, the more recent study of 
Vijh (2006), which uses the same proxy of complexity, presents evidence that complexity does 
not enhance financial flexibility.  
Finally, the findings of this research suggest that corporate complexity yields a 
competitive disadvantage for firms under the pressure of product market competition. Therefore, 
firms should consider adjusting their business holding portfolios in response to intensified 
competition in the product market. For instance, firms should focus more on their core 
businesses, which is supported by the findings of Thomas (2004) and Bowen and Wiersema 
(2005). In addition, the negative effect of the hierarchy in a business holding portfolio is the 
most magnified among the four proxies of corporate complexity discussed in the present study. 
Here it is proposed that firms should prioritize their adjustment of the hierarchy over the span 
of their business holding portfolios. 
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4.2 Prior literature and hypothesis development 
4.2.1 Corporate complexity 
In biology, a complex system comprises various connecting entities (Wolkenhauer and 
Muir, 2011). In management, Robson, Katsikeas & Bello (2008) define organizational 
complexity as the difficulties in enforcing collaboration in the organization due to the diversity 
in organizational structures, systems, and work procedures. In a spirit similar to that of 
Altomonte and Rungi (2013), which specified the structure of a business group as an affiliation 
comprising one headquarter and subsidiaries, here corporate complexity is defined from the 
perspective of a firm’s holding portfolio of subsidiaries or affiliates. The span and depth of the 
business holding portfolios of firms are also considered. The greater the level of hierarchy or 
the number of chains in the business holding structure of a firm, the more corporate complexity 
the firm has.  
Corporate complexity can be related to resource allocation, and the cost of 
communication and monitoring. A firm has to allocate its limited resources to operate its own 
business and to monitor other firms in its business holding portfolio. Hitt et al. (1990) developed 
a theory claiming that innovation is reduced when firms become more complex from acquisition 
because firms utilize resources in negotiation rather than committing to promote innovation. 
The empirical results of Seru (2014) also support this argument since firms use their resources 
in newly-acquired firms, which favors the new-toy effect. Moreover, corporate complexity can 
generate higher costs of communication and information transmission, which is supported by 
the evidence Skrastins and Vig (2019), where it is stated that loan performance is reduced when 
the hierarchy between bank branches and the central office increases due to information lost in 
the hierarchical structures. Apart from the notion of resource allocation, corporate complexity 
can also be seen to lead to difficulty in monitoring (La Porta et al., 1999), which is consistent 
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with the findings of Berry et al. (2006), where it is suggested that CEO turnover is less sensitive 
to firm performance in diversified firms.14  
In this research, the pressure from the product market competition (PMC) that every firm 
must encounter when operating its business is considered. More intense competition in the 
product market decreases the firm’s profitability as the price-demand elasticity of a firm 
increases (Lerner, 1934; Elzinga and Mills, 2011). The empirical results from the work of Xu 
(2012) also support the notion that firm profitability decreases when more foreign competitors 
penetrate the product market, leading to higher financial distress risks, and firms therefore 
reduce their leverage. This implies that the capital of firms becomes more limited, so firms 
reduce their business diversity to be able to share common resources or may divest certain 
businesses to get more funds, which will lead to simpler organizational structures of firms 
(Lamont, 1997; Bowen and Wiersema, 2005). Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) also find that after 
an upward shift in product market competition, firm structures become flatter to improve 
communication processes and operational efficiency, an idea that is consistent with the work of 
Bruns and Stalker (1961), where it is suggested that organic structure can remain flexible in 
serving a dynamic environment.  
On the other hand, some studies report that complexity benefits firms since they can re-
allocate resources between entities, making them utilize resource flexibly and thus leading to 
potentially producing greater innovation (Damanpour, 1996; Slovin and Sushka, 1997; 
Hovakimian, 2011; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2015). Specifically, the benefits of 
complexity are effective under certain circumstances, for example, when affiliates operate in 
similar businesses (Hoberg and Phillips, 2010) or when the level of complexity is not too high 
(Altomonte and Rungi, 2013). 
                                                 
14 La Porta et al. (1999) consider ownership structure as complexity and Berry et al. (2006) explore business 
diversification. 
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In line with the above argument, which corporate complexity decreases the efficiency of 
firm resource allocation and PMC reduces firm profitability, the following is conjectured: 
Hypothesis 4.1 Firms with higher corporate complexity experience a great decrease in 
firm performance when facing more intense product market 
competition. 
 
4.2.2 Financial constraints, opacity and investment expenditure 
The moderating role of financial constraints in the relationships among PMC, corporate 
complexity, and firm performance is considered. Intensified competition in the product market 
engenders less firm profitability (Lerner, 1934; Elzinga and Mills, 2011). Corporate complexity 
decreases efficiency in resource allocation and the communication of firms (Hitt et al., 1990; 
Seru, 1994; Skrastins and Vig, 2019). Altogether, this results in more limited internal capital of 
firms and thus firms must seek external capital (Xu, 2012). However, the cost of debt of firms 
rises when PMC is more intense, which leads to greater default risk for firms (Valta, 2012). In 
addition, Stern and Henderson (2004) find that complex firms, which are determined by the 
number of their product lines, have greater failure risk or a higher probability of exiting the 
market than less complex firms when PMC becomes more intense with more competitors 
entering the market. Hence, it is argued here that complex firms are more subject to intensified 
PMC when they are also financially constrained.15 This leads to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4.2 The interacting effect of corporate complexity and product market 
competition on firm performance is more pronounced for financially- 
constrained firms.  
                                                 
15 Slovin and Sushka (1997) provide counter-evidence, which complex firms allocate their financial resources more 
efficiently, but the findings of Vijh (2006) do not advise that complex firms have a benefit or disadvantage over 
less complex firms.  
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The opacity of firms is another factor that can be considered as a moderating effect. This 
refers to the asymmetric information between management or controlling shareholders and 
outside investors, whereby controlling shareholders tend to expropriate outside investors 
(Anderson et al., 2009; Ma, Ma & Tien, 2017). Furthermore, opaque stocks provide less firm-
specific information to the financial markets (Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton, Marcus & 
Tehranian, 2009). Thus, opaque firms will have more difficulty raising external capital. Ma et 
al. (2017) provide empirical evidence indicating that opaque firms have higher cost of debt, and 
Hutton et al. (2009) present the notion that opaque firms have greater stock price crash risk so 
these firms are less attractive to both debt and equity investors.  When facing more intense 
competition in the product market, which demands more external capital accessibility, complex 
firms are more affected if they are also opaque. Thus, the following is hypothesized:  
Hypothesis 4.3 The interacting effect of corporate complexity and product market 
competition on firm performance is more pronounced for opaque firms.  
 
Another moderating effect considered is investment expenditure. Investment-intensive 
firms refers to firms spending more on capital expenditure (CAPEX) relative to their rivals in 
the same industry. Investment-intensive firms have fewer available resources and may also need 
more funds to maintain their investment scale. As such, when they face an upward shift in 
product market competition, they have more limited access to capital due to less profitability 
from the pressure of product market competition and corporate complexity (Xu, 2012; Seru, 
2014). Thus, complex firms are more subject to intensified PMC if they are also investment-
intensive. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 4.4 The interacting effect of corporate complexity and product market 
competition on firm performance is more pronounced for investment-




Data from U.S. firms during the period 2012-2016 were used.16 The data on corporate 
complexity, which include information of subsidiaries, were from Bureau van Dijk (BvD). 
Firms’ financial, governance, and analyst data were also retrieved from Compustat, Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS), and IBES databases, respectively.  
 
4.3.2 Measures  
Three-digit SIC industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (Tobin’s Q) was used to measure firm 
performance. The variable of interest was the interaction term between corporate complexity 
and product market competition. Corporate complexity in terms of the number of subsidiaries 
(Nsub), the number of subsidiaries weighted by percentage of the firm’s ownership 
(Nsub_weight), the number of chains in the firm’s business holding structure (Nchain), and a 
dummy variable that indicated whether a firm had more than one level in its business holding 
structure (Dlevel) was considered. This is consistent with Altomonte and Rungi (2013), where 
a business group structure contains one headquarter and its affiliates. It should be noted that 
Nchain can represent the span of a firm’s business holding portfolio and Dlevel represents the 
depth of the firm’s holding portfolio.  
                                                 
16 The sample period in this chapter was only four years due to the data availability on corporate complexity. 
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Large U.S. tariff reductions as an exogenous upward shift in PMC were utilized because 
reducing the import tariff rate decreases trade barriers and increases pressure from foreign 
competitors (Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006; Fresard, 2010). Moreover, large import tariff 
reductions can be considered as exogenous shocks in a quasi-natural experiment since they are 
regulated under trade agreements and primarily influenced by global economics and politics 
(Huang, Jennings and Yu, 2017). Huang et al. (2017) were followed in calculating large tariff 
reductions defined as three times the median of tariff rate reduction during 2013-2015 within 
the three-digit SIC. Reductions in the preceding and following years that are greater than 80 
percent of the current reduction were eliminated in order to ensure that large tariff reductions 
were not temporary changes. The tariff rate was calculated as the ratio of duties collected by 
U.S. Customs to the free-on-board value of imports, which was provided on Peter Schott’s 
website.17 Based on this method, my sample contained 163 firms in 10 industries experiencing 
large tariff reductions, as reported in Appendix E. 
Three moderating effects were investigated, including financial constraints, opacity, and 
investment expenditure by subsampling the data into high and low groups of moderating effects. 
First, high financial constraint firms were defined as firms having a KZ index (Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1995; Cleary, 1999; Hovakimian, 2011) greater than the industrial median in each 
year.18 Next, a group of high-opaque firms contains firms with an opacity index greater than the 
annual industrial median. The opacity index contains four dimensions of trading volume, bid-
ask spread, and analyst following and analyst forecast errors (Anderson et al., 2009). Lastly, 
high investment expenditure firms were specified as firms spending on CAPEX, determined by 
the CAPEX/book value of total assets, more than the industrial median in each year. 
                                                 
17 http://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/sub_international.htm. Schott (2010) also used the data. 
18 KZ index is calculated as -1.002×(cash flow/net capital-1) + 0.283×(Market-to-book) + 3.139×(long-term and 
short-term debts/total assets) – 39.368×(dividends/net capital-1) – 1.315×(cash/net capital-1). 
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The control variables consisted of firm characteristic variables, including the number of 
business segments, CAPEX, cash holdings, firm size, firm age, leverage, ROA, and standard 
deviation of stock returns. The number of business segments was included as a control, which 
prior literature has considered a proxy of organizational complexity (Berry et al., 2006; 
Hovakimian, 2011; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2015), in order to control the influence from 
complexity within a firm which was different from what was examined in this research. 
Corporate governance control variables included the number of analysts following a firm and 
institutional ownership. These variables are related to product market competition, corporate 
complexity, and firm performance, and used in related literature (for example, Bushman, Chen, 
Engel & Smith, 2004; Stern and Henderson, 2004; D’Mello, Krishnaswami & Larkin, 2008; 




Potential endogeneity problems were acknowledged in this study, and one potential issue 
was omitted variable bias, which can lead to biased estimation in the relationships among firm 
performance, PMC, and corporate complexity. Another potential problem was reverse causality. 
For example, high profitability industries may attract more competitors to join or high 
profitability firms may have more access to capital, and decide to acquire other firms, which 
results in higher corporate complexity.  
Propensity-score-matching-difference-in-differences (PSM-DiD) was employed with 
exogenous shocks to PMC in order to mitigate endogeneity problems. Firms experiencing large 
tariff reductions (treated firms) were matched to firms not experiencing large tariff reductions 
(control firms) with a one-to-five nearest-neighbor propensity score. The propensity score was 
computed from one-year preceding large tariff reductions of CAPEX, cash holdings, firm size, 
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leverage, and the standard deviation of stock returns. This method follows Flammer (2015) and 
the empirical specification is as follows. 
Δ𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐶𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 × 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐶𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑡
× 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 × 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 × 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐶𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑡
× 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛄
′𝐗𝐢,𝐭 + 𝜃𝐼 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(4.1) 
where Δ𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is the difference between one-year Tobin’s Q of firm i following large tariff 
reductions in year t and one-year Tobin’s Q of firm i preceding large tariff reductions in year t. 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐶𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to one if firm i experiences large tariff reductions in 
year t. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 are corporate complexity and the number of business 
segments of firm i one-year preceding large tariff reductions in year t, respectively. 𝐗𝐢,𝐭 is a 
vector of control variables of firm i that are one-year preceding year t. 𝜃𝐼 and 𝜃𝑡 are industry 
and year fixed effects, respectively. 
 
4.4 Results 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of the variables 
of interest. Four variables representing corporate complexity (Nsub, Nsub_weight, Nchain, 
Nlevel19) were positively correlated and they were also positively correlated with the number of 
business segments. Tobin’s Q was negatively correlated with corporate complexity. 
 
                                                 
19 Nlevel is the number of hierarchies in a business holding portfolio of a firm. 
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Table 4.1  Descriptive statistics and correlations 
This table shows the descriptive statistics and correlations of the key variables used in the sample between 2012 – 2016. a, b and c indicate the significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Variable Mean Median SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
                   
1 Tobin's Q 5.951 0 37.559 1.000              
2 Nsub 80.384 11.000 186.841 -0.068a 1.000             
3 Nsub_weight 43.047 6.501 96.846 -0.070a 0.935a 1.000            
4 Nchain 37.931 7.000 92.021 -0.067a 0.750a 0.642a 1.000           
5 Nlevel 2.451 2.000 2.297 -0.127a 0.625a 0.681a 0.373a 1.000          
6 
Business 
segment 4.587 3.000 3.585 -0.054a 0.269a 0.287a 0.268a 0.337a 1.000         
7 Analyst 2.003 2.079 0.953 -0.027a 0.284a 0.283a 0.279a 0.317a 0.181a 1.000        
8 CAPEX 0.042 0.023 0.059 -0.008 -0.069a -0.064a -0.053a -0.044a 0.011 0.148a 1.000       
9 Cash holding 0.210 0.109 0.248 0.173a -0.175a -0.182a -0.171a -0.269a -0.232a -0.114a -0.167a 1.000      
10 Firm age 19.835 16.667 16.956 -0.009 0.259a 0.282a 0.210a 0.305a 0.303a 0.150a -0.004 -0.209a 1.000     
11 Firm size 6.084 6.481 2.837 -0.408a 0.449a 0.450a 0.409a 0.539a 0.352a 0.607a 0.066a -0.355a 0.276a 1.000    
12 
Institutional 
ownership 0.482 0.536 0.295 -0.136a 0.231a 0.238a 0.259a 0.369a 0.203a 0.485a 0.081a -0.117a 0.094a 0.561a 1.000   
13 Leverage 1.176 0.595 3.785 0.703a -0.059a -0.061a -0.058a -0.111a -0.037a 0.066a -0.035a 0.088a 0.024a -0.421a -0.154a 1.000  
14 ROA -0.370 0 1.976 -0.729a 0.100a 0.102a 0.097a 0.175a 0.127a 0.152a 0.018b -0.171a 0.151a 0.517a 0.243a -0.779a 1.000 
15 
Stock return 
SD 0.098 0.079 0.066 0.006 -0.167a -0.166a -0.142a -0.128a -0.248a -0.177a 0.014 0.342a -0.207a -0.443a -0.142a -0.046a -0.361a 
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The results of testing Hypothesis 4.1, which conjectures the negative effect of an upward 
shift in product market competition and corporate complexity on firm performance, are reported 
in Table 4.2. The firms in the sample were matched and DiD regressions were employed. The 
matched sample comprise 120 treated firms and 452 control firms. The results, as expected, 
reported that the coefficients of the Tariff cut on change in Tobin’s Q were negative and 
significant across all model specifications. Corporate complexity itself does not statistically 
significantly affect Tobin’s Q, but it amplifies the negative impact of Tariff cut on the change in 
Tobin’s Q. For example, the coefficients of Tariff cut and Tariff cut ×Nsub were -0.5118 at a 
1% significance and -0.0006 at a 5% significance, respectively, which implies that Tobin’s Q 
was reduced by 9.27% from the mean after experiencing large tariff reductions and Nsub 
enlarged the effect of Tariff cut on the change in Tobin’s Q as it was additionally reduced by 
1% from the mean when firms hold more one subsidiary. Among four proxies of corporate 
complexity, the coefficient of Tariff cut × Dlevel was the largest, which was -0.4842, meaning 
that the impact of Tariff cut on the change in Tobin’s Q was stronger as Tobin’s Q was further 
decreased by 8.14% from the mean when a firm had more than one level in its business holding 
portfolio. Interestingly, although corporate complexity and the number of business segments 
were positively correlated, the number of business segments weakened the negative effect of 
Tariff cut on the change in Tobin’s Q, which was opposite the effect of corporate complexity. 
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Table 4.2  Results of PSM-DiD regressions analyzing the effect of large import tariff reductions and corporate 
complexity on firm performance a 
 ΔTobin’s Q 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Tariff cut -0.5118*** -0.5230*** -0.5026*** -0.2368* 
 (0.1461) (0.1518) (0.1446) (0.1369) 
Nsubt-1 0.0001    
 (0.0002)    
Tariff cut × Nsubt-1 -0.0006**    
 (0.0003)    
Nsub_weightt-1  -0.0000   
  (0.0004)   
Tariff cut × Nsub_weightt-1  -0.0011**   
  (0.0005)   
Nchaint-1   0.0005  
   (0.0005)  
Tariff cut × Nchain t-1   -0.0011*  
   (0.0006)  
Dlevel t-1    0.1145 
    (0.1286) 
Tariff cut × Dlevelt-1    -0.4842* 
    (0.2536) 
Business segmentt-1 -0.0123 -0.0123 -0.0139 -0.0129 
 (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0136) (0.0118) 
Tariff cut × Business segmentt-1 0.0665*** 0.0692** 0.0640*** 0.0676** 
 (0.0253) (0.0270) (0.0238) (0.0330) 
Analystt-1 0.0619 0.0579 0.0585 0.0474 
 (0.1126) (0.1122) (0.1122) (0.1047) 
CAPEXt-1 1.1989 1.2156 1.2950 1.1409 
 (1.1193) (1.1125) (1.0833) (1.0933) 
Cash holdingt-1 0.0948 0.0909 0.0963 -0.0157 
 (0.2347) (0.2354) (0.2324) (0.2680) 
Firm aget-1 0.0021 0.0022 0.0021 0.0015 
 (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0023) 
Firm sizet-1 -0.0408 -0.0323 -0.0465 -0.0389 
 (0.0822) (0.0804) (0.0821) (0.0681) 
Institutional ownershipt-1 -0.1493 -0.1705 -0.1410 -0.0990 
 (0.2437) (0.2409) (0.2540) (0.2682) 
Leveraget-1 0.2896 0.2820 0.2986 0.2897 
 (0.1887) (0.1912) (0.1897) (0.1940) 
ROAt-1 0.0170 0.0047 0.0367 0.0731 
 (0.4754) (0.4804) (0.4781) (0.4285) 
Stock return SDt-1 -0.7670 -0.7931 -0.7298 -0.7618 
 (1.5872) (1.5998) (1.5902) (1.5441) 
Tobin’s Qt-1 -0.5241*** -0.5236*** -0.5244*** -0.5176*** 
 (0.0573) (0.0573) (0.0575) (0.0562) 
Constant 0.2106 0.1859 0.2279 0.1486 
 (0.4749) (0.4715) (0.4651) (0.4413) 
     
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.646 
Observations 572 572 572 572 
a Robust standard errors clustered by three-digit SIC are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
87 
In order to test Hypothesis 4.2, which posits that the negative effect of an upward shift 
in product market competition and corporate complexity on firm performance is stronger in 
financial constraint firms, subsample analysis of high and low financial constraint firms was 
applied, which was determined by using the KZ index and PSM-DiD. Table 4.3 reports that the 
coefficients of the interactions between Tariff cut and corporate complexity were negative and 
significant only in high financial constraint firms in all proxies of corporate complexity, as 
expected. Among the four proxies of corporate complexity, Dlevel strengthens the negative 




Table 4.3  Subsample analysis of financial constraints a 
  ΔTobin’s Q 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                
Tariff cut 1.0138** -0.3458 1.1003** -0.4000 1.0564** -0.3029 0.5674 -0.0426 
 (0.4970) (0.4260) (0.4944) (0.4303) (0.4985) (0.4296) (0.8201) (0.4908) 
Nsubt-1 0.0000 0.0009**       
 (0.0005) (0.0003)       
Tariff cut × Nsubt-1 0.0011 -0.0025***       
 (0.0009) (0.0004)       
Nsub_weightt-1   0.0003 0.0015**     
   (0.0010) (0.0006)     
Tariff cut × Nsub_weightt-1   0.0022 -0.0045***     
   (0.0014) (0.0007)     
Nchaint-1     0.0011 0.0035***   
     (0.0009) (0.0010)   
Tariff cut × Nchain t-1     0.0005 -0.0049***   
     (0.0012) (0.0010)   
Dlevel t-1       -0.3655 -0.0579 
       (0.4399) (0.1814) 
Tariff cut × Dlevelt-1       0.3461 -0.4994** 
       (0.5093) (0.2261) 
Business segmentt-1 -0.0039 -0.0611** -0.0032 -0.0630** -0.0101 -0.0630*** -0.0121 -0.0557** 
 (0.0248) (0.0242) (0.0239) (0.0249) (0.0200) (0.0237) (0.0188) (0.0237) 
Tariff cut × Business segmentt-1 -0.0762 0.2107*** -0.0837 0.2248*** -0.0553 0.2034*** -0.0241 0.1815*** 
 (0.0753) (0.0339) (0.0688) (0.0325) (0.0584) (0.0330) (0.0403) (0.0376) 
         
KZ index Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.5080 0.7667 0.5092 0.7679 0.5075 0.7663 0.507 0.766 
Observations 189 224 189 224 189 224 189 224 
a Robust standard errors clustered by three-digit SIC are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.4 presents the results of testing Hypothesis 4.3, which postulates that opaque 
firms have a stronger negative impact of an upward shift in product market competition and 
corporate complexity on firm performance. Opaque firms are firms whose opacity indexes are 
greater than the industrial median opacity index in each year. As predicted, the coefficients of 
the interactions between Tariff cut and corporate complexity were negative and significant only 
in high opaque firms. Among the four proxies of corporate complexity, Dlevel enhanced the 
negative impact of the Tariff cut on the change in Tobin’s Q the most when firms had high 
opacity index.    
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Table 4.4  Subsample analysis of opacity a 
  ΔTobin’s Q 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                
Tariff cut -0.8904* 0.2038 -0.8824* 0.2009 -0.9130* 0.1793 -1.3489 0.2810 
 (0.5188) (0.2820) (0.4970) (0.2840) (0.5318) (0.3133) (0.9005) (0.2636) 
Nsubt-1 -0.0005 0.0000       
 (0.0011) (0.0004)       
Tariff cut × Nsubt-1 0.0012 -0.0055***       
 (0.0017) (0.0016)       
Nsub_weightt-1   -0.0005 -0.0001     
   (0.0020) (0.0007)     
Tariff cut × Nsub_weightt-1   0.0016 -0.0093***     
   (0.0024) (0.0029)     
Nchaint-1     -0.0000 -0.0006   
     (0.0014) (0.0024)   
Tariff cut × Nchain t-1     -0.0001 -0.0093***   
     (0.0016) (0.0024)   
Dlevel t-1       0.6320 -0.0422 
       (1.0497) (0.1551) 
Tariff cut × Dlevelt-1       0.5049 -0.4090** 
       (1.4144) (0.1738) 
Business segmentt-1 -0.0127 0.0156 -0.0178 0.0156 -0.0268 0.0169 -0.0313 0.0150 
 (0.0341) (0.0174) (0.0333) (0.0173) (0.0338) (0.0171) (0.0404) (0.0174) 
Tariff cut × Business segmentt-1 0.1373** 0.0620*** 0.1494** 0.0623*** 0.1918* 0.0583*** 0.1766 0.0569*** 
 (0.0562) (0.0230) (0.0698) (0.0225) (0.1052) (0.0200) (0.1229) (0.0200) 
         
Opacity Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SIC3 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0528 0.7964 0.0525 0.7964 0.0522 0.7956 0.054 0.797 
Observations 194 228 194 228 194 228 194 228 
a Robust standard errors clustered by three-digit SIC are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Lastly, Hypothesis 4.4, positing that the negative effect of an upward shift in product 
market competition and corporate complexity on firm performance is stronger in firms with high 
CAPEX, was tested, where the CAPEX is greater than the industrial median CAPEX in each 
year. Table 4.5, as expected, reports that the coefficients of the interactions between Tariff cut 
and corporate complexity were negative and significant only in firms with a high CAPEX. 
However, only two of the four proxies of corporate complexity—Nsub and Nsub_weight—were 
statistically significant.  
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Table 4.5  Subsample analysis of CAPEX a 
  ΔTobin’s Q 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                
Tariff cut -0.2210 -0.1254 -0.2068 -0.1360 -0.3247** -0.1403 -0.4486 -0.0065 
 (0.1893) (0.1462) (0.1884) (0.1480) (0.1589) (0.1567) (0.2743) (0.1832) 
Nsubt-1 0.0007 0.0004*       
 (0.0007) (0.0002)       
Tariff cut × Nsubt-1 -0.0005 -0.0007*       
 (0.0006) (0.0004)       
Nsub_weightt-1   0.0013 0.0006     
   (0.0012) (0.0004)     
Tariff cut × Nsub_weightt-1   -0.0008 -0.0012**     
   (0.0011) (0.0005)     
Nchaint-1     -0.0001 0.0002   
     (0.0013) (0.0004)   
Tariff cut × Nchain t-1     -0.0003 -0.0009   
     (0.0015) (0.0006)   
Dlevel t-1       -0.4450* -0.2620 
       (0.2407) (0.1699) 
Tariff cut × Dlevelt-1       0.3395 -0.2019 
       (0.2869) (0.2013) 
Business segmentt-1 -0.0247 -0.0053 -0.0238 -0.0040 -0.0183 -0.0012 -0.0155 -0.0001 
 (0.0230) (0.0160) (0.0219) (0.0163) (0.0218) (0.0155) (0.0198) (0.0157) 
Tariff cut × Business segmentt-1 0.0747** 0.0725*** 0.0745*** 0.0729*** 0.0762*** 0.0698*** 0.0447* 0.0605** 
 (0.0282) (0.0235) (0.0277) (0.0243) (0.0182) (0.0244) (0.0262) (0.0261) 
         
CAPEX Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.5400 0.6920 0.5404 0.6918 0.5380 0.6913 0.546 0.695 
Observations 209 334 209 334 209 334 209 334 
a Robust standard errors clustered by three-digit SIC are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.5 Robustness check 
The robustness of the results was further tested with an alternative proxy of firm 
performance—that is—sales growth (also used by Baum and Wally, 2003). Table 4.6 shows 
that the coefficients of the interactions of Tariff cut and corporate complexity on the change in 
sales growth were negative and significant with every proxy of corporate complexity and Dlevel 
was the largest amplification of the negative effect of Tariff cut on the change in sales growth, 
which is consistent with the baseline results in Table 4.2 and complements Hypothesis 4.1. 
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Table 4.6  Robustness check a 
  ΔSale growth 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Tariff cut 0.0437 0.0348 0.0234 0.1889** 
 (0.0475) (0.0465) (0.0507) (0.0918) 
Nsubt-1 -0.0000    
 (0.0001)    
Tariff cut × Nsubt-1 -0.0003**    
 (0.0002)    
Nsub_weightt-1  -0.0001   
  (0.0001)   
Tariff cut × Nsub_weightt-1  -0.0005**   
  (0.0002)   
Nchaint-1   0.0001  
   (0.0001)  
Tariff cut × Nchain t-1   -0.0005**  
   (0.0002)  
Dlevel t-1    -0.0259 
    (0.0474) 
Tariff cut × Dlevelt-1    -0.3157** 
    (0.1543) 
Business segmentt-1 -0.0044 -0.0043 -0.0049 -0.0059 
 (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0050) 
Tariff cut × Business segmentt-1 0.0179 0.0177 0.0143 0.0172 
 (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0151) 
Analystt-1 0.0543 0.0529 0.0562 0.0350 
 (0.0372) (0.0374) (0.0378) (0.0310) 
CAPEXt-1 -0.6693 -0.6530 -0.6595 -0.7005 
 (0.8307) (0.8353) (0.8366) (0.8379) 
Cash holdingt-1 0.3134** 0.3069** 0.3039** 0.2207* 
 (0.1254) (0.1238) (0.1213) (0.1240) 
Firm aget-1 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0020 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0020) 
Firm sizet-1 0.0049 0.0071 -0.0023 0.0089 
 (0.0227) (0.0222) (0.0208) (0.0225) 
Institutional ownershipt-1 -0.2566 -0.2631 -0.2432 -0.1672 
 (0.1967) (0.1980) (0.1878) (0.1548) 
Leveraget-1 -0.3324* -0.3342* -0.3290* -0.2924* 
 (0.1950) (0.1968) (0.1906) (0.1628) 
ROAt-1 -0.4440** -0.4494** -0.4309** -0.3711*** 
 (0.1773) (0.1792) (0.1714) (0.1355) 
Stock return SDt-1 -1.6196* -1.6282* -1.5734* -1.5923** 
 (0.8430) (0.8459) (0.8262) (0.7730) 
Sale growtht-1 -0.7251*** -0.7261*** -0.7247*** -0.7410*** 
 (0.0606) (0.0613) (0.0581) (0.0548) 
Constant 0.3669 0.3640 0.3965* 0.3671* 
 (0.2260) (0.2303) (0.2385) (0.2060) 
     
SIC3 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.231 0.231 0.230 0.240 
Observations 426 426 426 426 
a Robust standard errors clustered by three-digit SIC are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.6 Discussion 
The effect of corporate complexity on firm performance when firms experience an 
upward shift in product market competition was examined by applying PSM-DiD to analyze 
this relationship in order to mitigate endogeneity problems. The results confirmed the hypothesis 
that when firms face intensified product market competition, corporate complexity negatively 
impacts firm performance, which can be explained by the inefficiency of resource allocation 
(Hitt et al., 1990; Seru, 1994; Bowen and Wiersema, 2005; Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010; Skrastins 
and Vig, 2019). In particular, focus was placed on financial resources because internal capital 
is directly affected by the decline in firm profitability due to the threat of product market 
competition. This argument is corroborated by subsample analysis whose results suggest that 
the negative effect of corporate complexity and product market competition on firm 
performance is statistically significant only in firms with a high demand for capital and that have 
difficulty in accessing it, such as financial constraint firms, opaque firms, and high investment 
firms.  
Among the four proxies of corporate complexity discussed in this study, the dummy 
variable of the level of subsidiaries greater than one (Dlevel) had the largest impact on firm 
performance when firms experienced more intense product market competition, which suggests 
that the hierarchy of the holding structure plays the most vital role, and firms may consider 
adjusting the level before the span, which is proxied by Nchain, of their business holding 
portfolios. The percentage of ownership in a business holding portfolio was seen to have a partial 
influence on firm performance, as a number of subsidiaries weighted by the percentage of 
ownership (Nsub_weight) reduced firm performance slightly greater than the number of 
subsidiaries (Nsub) did. Moreover, the proxies had a reverse effect from business diversification, 
which is used in many studies of complexity (Hovakimian, 2011; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 
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2015). This can be interpreted in the sense that different dimensions of complexity have diverse 
outcomes. 
These results are partially different from the findings of Guadalupe and Wulf (2010). 
Here it was found that both the span and hierarchy in the firm business holding portfolios 
reinforced the negative effect of product market competition on firm performance. However, 
Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) reported that an upward shift in product market competition 
decreases the hierarchy but increases the span of organizational structure, which implies that 
firms respond to more intense product market competition by flattening their structure to 
maintain or enhance their performance. It can be inferred then that the structure of the cross-
holding and the structure within a firm have different impacts on firm performance in response 
to product market competition. 
One limitation of this research is that with the limitation of the data, corporate 
complexity as a separate entity in a firm’s business holding portfolio was considered without 
considering its business relatedness. Future research might discuss how firms adjust their 
business holding portfolios when the business relatedness is considered in order to respond to 
certain circumstances when the data are available. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Using novel data on corporate complexity, including both the depth and span of the 
business holding portfolios of firms, this research investigates how corporate complexity 
influences firm performance when firms face more intense product market competition. 
Hypotheses were developed based on the argument that corporate complexity is associated with 
inefficiency of resource allocation such that firms with higher corporate complexity experience 
a greater decrease in firm performance when facing more intense in competition in the product 
market competition. The PSM-DiD approach was employed in order to mitigate potential 
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endogeneity concerns. It was shown that corporate complexity reinforces the adverse effect of 
product market competition on firm performance, and this impact is more prominent for firms 
that have a higher demand for capital but have more difficulty in accessing both internal and 
external capitals. These findings contribute to the literature on organizational complexity in that 
how the distinct dimensions of corporate complexity interact with PMC and affect firm 
performance was investigated. The results suggest the importance of corporate complexity in 
response to the escalated competitive pressure from the product market. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This thesis consists of three studies examining the strategic reactions of firms to product 
market competition, including the incentive dispersion among the TMT, the relative 
compensation of a CEO to the compensation of other executives within a firm, and corporate 
complexity. A quasi-natural experiment was carried out and large import tariff reductions were 
applied as exogenous shocks in order to mitigate endogeneity problems. The findings support 
the theory in both the finance and management literature, for example the social comparison 
theory, the agency cost theory, and resource allocation, and suggest strategic implications for 
firms so that they can maintain their competitiveness when facing more intensified product 
markets.   
The following is a summary of the main findings and contributions, limitations, and 
avenues for future research of this thesis. 
 
5.1 Summary of the main findings and contributions 
The first study, which is presented in Chapter 2, examines the effect of product market 
competition on TMT incentive dispersion. The results report that more intensified product 
market competition reduces incentive dispersion in the TMT and this impact is stronger for 
innovative and diversified firms. These findings contribute to the social comparison theory and 
TMT incentives, indicating that members of the team do not feel inequity and therefore the 
incentive distribution between the TMT can be strategically used to promote cooperation in the 
team (Gartenberg and Wulf, 2017; Ridge et al., 2017). In addition, the results suggest that 
cooperation in the team is more desirable especially when firms need a quick response to a 
dynamic environment, such as seen in innovative and diversified market segments. 
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The second study, reported in Chapter 3, investigates the impact of product market 
competition on the relative compensation of the CEO to the compensation of other top 
executives. The results show that the gap in compensation between the CEO and other 
executives is lower, implying that the CEO becomes less powerful when the firm is pressured 
by more intensified competition in the product market. These results add to the agency cost 
theory of powerful CEOs, where it is suggested that powerful CEOs tend to be entrenched 
(Bebchuk et al., 2011; Vo and Canil, 2019), so firms should implement compensation policy 
between CEOs and other top executives in order to control the CEO’s power. Moreover, firms 
should balance external governance, such as product market competition, with corporate 
governance since product market competition serves as a substitute for corporate governance as 
it diminishes the CEO’s power more for firms with weak corporate governance.  
The third study in Chapter 4 of the thesis examines the effect of corporate complexity 
on firm performance under the threat of product market competition. Employing new proxies of 
corporate complexity, this study finds that corporate complexity reduces firm performance when 
firms face intense competition in the product market, which is different from the evidence in 
prior literature (Hovakimian, 2011; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2015). In addition, this study 
suggests that financial demand and flexibility are mechanisms of this effect since the 
performance of firms with high degrees of financial constraints, opacity, and investment are 
more strongly negatively affected by corporate complexity and product market competition. 
Overall, corporate complexity is related to the inefficiency of resource allocation and firms 
should consider corporate complexity as one strategy in response to product market competition.  
 
5.2 Limitations 
The results of this thesis suggest strategic implementations of the incentive distribution 
among top management members, the pay gap between the CEO and other executives, and 
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corporate complexity in response to product market competition. This research was not able to 
evaluate the mechanisms that firms use to readjust these strategies because of data availability. 
However, various alternative proxies for the dependent variables are considered in each study, 
such as individual performance awards and the dispersion of compensation complexity for the 
first study, the probability that the CEO pay gap in firms is higher than for other firms in the 
same industry for the second study, and sales growth for the third study. HHI, the Lerner index, 
and large import tariff reductions are used as proxies for product market competition. The results 
in every study are still robust. 
Due to the data availability for executive compensation, the first and second studies 
focus on firms in the S&P 1500, which leads to a concentration on large firms. However, the 
evidence on Chinese SMEs from the work of Munir, Kok, Teplova and Li (2017) suggests that 
powerful CEOs are entrenched, which is in align with the second study. For the third study, the 
data on corporate complexity were available from the year 2012, so the period for this study is 
shorter than for the other two.  
 
5.3 Avenues for future research 
This thesis examines only three strategic reactions of firms in order to respond an 
increase of competitive pressure. Firms can also consider other strategies, for example, 
voluntary disclosure (Huang et al., 2017) and corporate social responsibility (Flammer, 2015), 
which have negative and positive responses to more intense product market competition, 
respectively. Therefore, future research can examine the interplay between these strategies when 
firms are pressured by intense competition in the product market, concerning whether these 
strategies are complementary or substitute for one another.  
Another possible avenue for future research is to consider the business relatedness 
between affiliates when corporate complexity is investigated. Altomonte and Rungi (2013) 
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report the negative correlation between vertical integration, which is related to the supply chain, 
and the hierarchical complexity of a business group. This may provide additional implications 
for firms when they consider readjusting their business holding portfolios to respond to intense 






Definitions of variables – Chapter 2 
Variable  Description 
   
Dependent variables   
Total incentive dispersion (GINI)  The gini coefficient of the proportion of TMT total incentive-based 







(𝑦1 + 2𝑦2 + ⋯ + 𝑛𝑦𝑛) 
where 𝑛 is the number of TMT members. 𝑦1 , … , 𝑦𝑛 is the proportion 
of TMT total incentive-based pay in descending order. 𝑦 is the mean 
of the proportion of TMT total incentive-based pay.  
The proportion of TMT total incentive-based pay is the ratio of the 
summation of LTIP, restricted stocks and stock options to total 
compensation. 
Total incentive dispersion (CV)  The coefficient of variation of the proportion of TMT total incentive-
based pay. 
Equity incentive dispersion 
(GINI) 
 The gini coefficient of the proportion of TMT equity incentive-based 
pay where equity incentive-based pay is the summation of restricted 
stocks and stock options. 
Equity incentive dispersion (CV)  The coefficient of variation coefficient of the proportion of TMT 
equity incentive-based pay. 
Pay performance sensitivity (PPS)  The dollar change in granted incentives to an executive for a one-
percentage point change in firm value divided by total compensation. 
Compensation contract 
complexity (diversity) 
 One minus the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) based on the 




 The number of components determining possible payouts from 
incentive contracts by considering only short-term cash bonus, long-
term cash bonus, restricted stocks (RSU) and stock options. The 
maximum score is 24. 
Compensation contract 
complexity (no. of incentive 
package) 
 All award types including short-term cash bonus, long-term cash 
bonus, RSU, stock options, unit cash, phantom stocks, reload options 
and stock appreciation rights. 
Dispersion of compensation 
contract complexity 
 The Gini coefficient and CV of compensation contract complexity. 
Individual performance award 
(percentage) 
 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 × %𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
Individual performance award 
(dummy) 
 Equaling one if firms grant individual performance awards. 
   
Independent variable of interest   
Tariff cut  The large import tariff reductions considered as three times the 
median of tariff rate reduction during 1994-2011. The tariff rate is 
computed based on three-digit SIC as the ratio of duties collected by 
U.S. Customs to the free-on-board value of imports.  
   
Firm financial controls   
Cash/asset  Cash / book value of total assets. 
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Variable  Description 
Firm size  Logarithm of book value of total assets. 
Leverage  Long term liability / total assets 
Return on assets (ROA)  Earnings before interest and tax / total assets adjusted with the 
industry median of ROA. 
Stock return standard deviation  The standard deviation of monthly stock return  
Tobin’s Q  Tobin’s Q of each firm is calculated from (Market value of equity + 
book value of total assets – book value of equity – deferred taxes) / 
book value of total assets. Then, it is adjusted with the median of 
Tobin’s Q in each industry. 
   
Corporate governance controls   
CEO chair duality  The dummy variable equalling one if the CEO also serves as a Chair 
of the board. 
CEO tenure  The number of years that the CEO serves in the position till that 
fiscal year. 
Insider ownership  The fraction of shares owned by the insiders in ExecuComp. 
Number of VP  The number of vice presidents among top five executives. 






Appendix B  
Definitions of variables – Chapter 3 
Variable  Description 
   
CEO power:   
CEO pay slice (CPS)  The fraction of CEO total compensation to the top five executive 
total compensation. Total compensation is obtained from the 
TDC1 item in ExecuComp. 
CEO pay gap  A dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm’s CEO pay gap 
is greater than the 3-digit SIC industry median for the year, and 
otherwise zero. Pay gap is calculated as the difference between 
CEO total compensation and the median of the top five-executive 
total compensation. 
Title distance  The difference between a number of titles that a CEO has and the 
mean of a number of titles of other directors.  
No. of committees CEO serving on  The number of committees that a CEO is a member, including 
audit committee, compensation committee, nominating committee 
and corporate governance committee. 
   
The product market competition:   
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)  The sum of the squared market share of firms in each industry. 
Lerner index  EBITDA / sales 
   
Firm financial control variables:   
Cash holdings  Cash / book value of total assets. 
Firm size  Logarithm of book value of total assets. 
Leverage  Long term liability / total assets 
Return on assets (ROA)  ROA of each firm is computed from earnings before interest and 
tax / total assets; then adjusted by the median of the ROA in each 
industry. 
Stock return SD  The standard deviation of monthly stock returns  
Tobin’s Q  Tobin’s Q of each firm is calculated from (the market value of 
equity + book value of total assets – book value of equity – 
deferred taxes) / book value of total assets. It is then adjusted by 
the median of Tobin’s Q in each industry. 
   
Corporate governance control variables: 
CEO chair duality  A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO also serves as a Chair 
of the board and otherwise zero. 
High CEO ownership  A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO owns at least 20% of 
total shares in the firm and otherwise zero. 
CEO tenure  The number of years that the CEO serves in the position. 
Insider ownership  The fraction of shares owned by insiders. 
Number of VP  The number of vice presidents. 
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Appendix C  
Definitions of variables – Chapter 4 
Variable  Description 
   
Tobin’s Q  Tobin’s Q of each firm was calculated from  
(the market value of equity + book value of total assets – book 
value of equity – deferred taxes) / book value of total assets. It 
was then adjusted by the median of Tobin’s Q in each industry. 
Tariff cut  The large import tariff reductions were considered as three times 
the median of tariff rate reduction during 2013-2015. The tariff 
rate was computed based on a three-digit SIC as the ratio of duties 
collected by U.S. Customs to the free-on-board value of imports.  
Nsub  Number of subsidiaries in a business holding portfolio 
Nsub_weight  Number of subsidiaries weighted by a percentage of ownership in 
a business holding portfolio 
Nchain  Number of chains in a business holding portfolio 
Nlevel  Number of hierarchies in a business holding portfolio 
Dlevel  A dummy equal to one if Nlevel is greater than one 
Business segment  Number of business segments of a firm based on a two-digit SIC 
Analyst  Logarithm of number of analysts following a firm 
CAPEX  CAPEX / book value of total assets 
Cash holding  Cash / book value of total assets 
Firm age  The current year minus the year in which a firm was first listed on 
the CRSP. 
Firm size  Logarithm of book value of total assets 
Institutional ownership  The fraction of shares owned by institutional investors 
Leverage  Total liability / total assets 
Return on assets (ROA)  The ROA of each firm was computed from earnings before 
interest and tax / total assets, then adjusted by the median of the 
ROA in each industry. 
Stock return SD  The standard deviation of monthly stock returns 
Sales growth  The percentage change in sales from the previous year 




Appendix D  
List of industries affected by large import tariff reductions – 
Chapters 2 and 3 
Three-digit 
SIC 




201  Meat Products   2008  6 
203  
Canned, Frozen and Preserved Fruits, Vegetables, Food 
Special  
 1995  2 
204  Grain Mill Products   1995  5 
206  Sugar and Confectionery Products   2008  3 
207  Fats and Oils  2005  1 
208  Beverages   1998  8 
211  Cigarettes   2000  2 
221  Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Cotton.   1995  6 
242  Sawmills and Planing Mills   2011  3 
261  Pulp Mills.   2004  2 
262  Paper Mills.   1995  7 
263  Paperboard Mills.   2004  4 
265  Paperboard Containers and Boxes   1995  1 
267  
Converted Paper, Paperboard Products Except Container 
Or Box  
 1995  6 
271  Newspapers: Publishing, Or Publishing and Printing.   1999  5 
275  Commercial Printing   1995  3 
281  Industrial Inorganic Chemicals   2007  10 
282  Plastics Materials and Synthetics   1995  7 
283  Drugs   1995  45 
284  
Soap, Detergents, Cleaning Preparations, Perfumes, 
Cosmetics  
 1995  7 
285  
Paints, Varnishes, Lacquers, Enamels, and Allied 
Products.  
 1996  3 
286  Industrial Organic Chemicals   1995  5 
287  Agricultural Chemicals   1999  3 
289  Miscellaneous Chemical Products   1995  8 
291  Petroleum Refining   2000  5 
302  Rubber and Plastics Footwear.   2005  3 
305  
Gaskets, Packing, and Sealing Devices, Rubber/Plastic 
Hose  
 1995  1 
324  Cement, Hydraulic.   1995  1 
329  Abrasive, Asbestos, Misc. Nonmetallic Mineral Products   1996  2 
331  
Steel Works, Plast Furnaces, and Rolling Andfinishing 
Mills  
 2004  11 
332  Iron and Steel Foundries   1995  2 
333  Primary Smelting and Refining of Nonferrous Metals   1998  4 
334  Secondary Smelting and Refining of Nonferrous Metals.   2010  1 
341  Metal Cans and Shipping Containers   1995  2 
342  Cutlery, Hand Tools, and General Hardware   1996  3 
343  Heating Equipment Except Electric, Warm Air, Plumbing   1998  1 
345  
Screw Machine Products, Bolts, Nuts, Screws, Rivets, 
Washers  
 1999  1 
348  
Ordnance and Accessories, Except Vehicles and Guided 
Missile  
 1995  2 









Special Industry Machinery, Except Metalworking 
Machinery  
 1995  4 
356  General Industrial Machinery and Equipment   1999  13 
358  Refrigeration and Service Industry Machinery   1995  6 
362  Electrical Industrial Apparatus   1995  4 
366  Communications Equipment   1998  18 
369  
Miscellaneous Electrical Machinery, Equipment and 
Supplies 
 1995  3 
375  Motorcycles, Bicycles, and Parts.   1995  2 
376  Guided Missiles, Space Vehicles, Parts   1999  2 
381  
Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, Aeronautical, 
Naut  
 1997  3 
382  
Lab Apparatus and Analytical, Optical, Measuring, 
Controls  
 1997  14 
384  Surgical, Medical and Dental Instruments and Supplies   1995  29 
387  Watches, Clocks, Clockwork Operated Devices and Parts   2006  1 
394  Dolls, Toys, Games and Sporting and Athletic Goods   1995  5 
399  Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries.   1995  1 




Appendix E  










208  Beverages   2014  10 
211  Cigarettes   2013  4 
242  Sawmills and Planing Mills   2014  3 
278  Blank books, Loose-leaf  Binders, Bookbinding and 
Related Work 
 2015  2 
283  Drugs   2015  103 
301  Tires and Inner Tubes  2013  1 
329  Abrasives, Asbestos, Misc. Nonmetallic Mineral Products   2013  4 
341  Metal Cans and Shipping Containers   2014  3 
353  Construction, Mining, and Material-Handling Machinery  2015  19 
372  Aircrafts and Parts  2013  14 
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